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I. Introduction
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants “the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury.”1 As established in In re Winship,2 this
jury guarantee also gives a criminal defendant the right to
demand that a jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
“every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.”3 In the years following In re Winship, the Court
expanded its interpretation of this reasonable-doubt standard by
attempting to identify the type of facts necessary to prove a
defendant’s criminal charge.4 A distinction eventually emerged
between facts that constituted elements of the crime and facts
that constituted sentencing factors.5 Elements of the crime were
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
3. Id. at 364; see also Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and
Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1103
(2001) (explaining that both the loss of liberty associated with criminal
convictions and the need to blunt community concerns regarding the conviction
of innocent people contributed to the formation of the reasonable-doubt
standard); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Determinate Sentencing in Light of
the Supreme Court’s “Elements” Jurisprudence, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1236, 1236
(2004) (describing Winship as “constitutionalizing” the reasonable-doubt
standard).
4. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 684 (1975) (assessing whether
the prosecution must prove the absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation
beyond a reasonable doubt in a homicide case).
5. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (noting that this
distinction was “unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury,
and judgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation’s
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charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt
to a jury, while sentencing factors were entrusted to the
sentencing judge under a lower standard of proof.6 In 1987,
Congress documented this distinction in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (the Guidelines),7 utilizing a complex and formulaic
sentencing scheme that allowed judges to find particular
sentencing factors by a preponderance of the evidence and
enhance the severity of a defendant’s punishment in correlation
with said factors.8 It is from this foundation that modern
sentencing procedure has developed. Following the enactment of
the Guidelines, the Court would spend several decades (what this
Note refers to as “the Apprendi9 revolution”) attempting to square
the use of sentencing factors found by judges, rather than juries,
with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
After years of slowly chipping away at judicial fact-finding in
the sentencing process, a narrow majority of the Court ended this
complex saga of sentencing case law in Alleyne v. United States,10
holding that any fact that increases the mandatory maximum or
the mandatory minimum of a sentence is an “element” of the
crime that must be submitted to the jury to be found beyond a
reasonable doubt.11 Thus, while the Sixth Amendment does not
expressly guarantee criminal defendants the right to sentencing
founding”).
6. See Bibas, supra note 3, at 1102 (referencing McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 84–86, 91 (1986)); see also Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced For a
“Crime” the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the
Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather Than
Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 249 (1998) (explaining
that unlike elements of the crime, sentencing factors affect only the severity of
the sentence imposed, not the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and may be found
by a preponderance of the evidence by the judge).
7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2004).
8. See id. § 3B1.4 (enhancing a defendant’s sentence, for example, if he
uses a minor in the commission of the crime).
9. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi v. New Jersey
marked the first case in which the Court drastically returned sentence-related
fact-finding to the jury. See id. at 466 (holding that the Constitution requires
that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt).
10. 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
11. Id. at 2153.
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by jury, the Alleyne Court ultimately determined, in an expansive
interpretation of the Constitution, that the Sixth Amendment
encompasses the right to have a jury find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, any factor that enhances a criminal sentence.12
Despite the finality of the Alleyne decision, however, one
exception to the rule remains—prior convictions. During the
course of the Apprendi revolution, the Court carved out one
narrow exception in the sentencing process for recidivism; under
its holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,13 the Court
concluded that prior convictions are “sentencing factors” which
may be determined by a judge by a preponderance of the
evidence, and which need not be alleged in the indictment or
proven to a jury.14 While the holding in Alleyne seemed to signal
an end to judicial fact-finding within the sentencing process, the
Court refused to address whether its decision had any impact on
Almendarez-Torres, thereby leaving the prior convictions
exception undisturbed, albeit on shaky ground.15 As a result,
lower courts are now faced with a dilemma: despite continuing to
uphold Almendarez-Torres as good law, many courts believe that
the exception has been completely eroded by the Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence of the Apprendi revolution.16
Regrettably, if the prior convictions exception is no longer valid,
innumerable criminal defendants have received unconstitutional
sentences under the flawed rule of Almendarez-Torres.17 Thus, it
12. See Molly Gulland Gaston, Never Efficient, but Always Free: How the
Juvenile Adjudication Question Is the Latest Sign That Almendarez-Torres v.
United States Should Be Overturned, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1167–68 (2008)
(claiming that the Court’s decision to end judicial fact-finding within the
sentencing process signaled a return to the Framers’ intent that the Sixth
Amendment should protect individuals from an over-punitive government).
13. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
14. See id. at 244 (describing the judicial system’s longstanding tradition of
treating recidivism as a factor of punishment only).
15. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160 n.1 (reasoning that because neither
party contested Almendarez-Torres, Alleyne is not the proper vehicle to address
the validity of the prior convictions exception).
16. See Velasquez v. Faulk, No. 12-CV-02057-WYD, 2014 WL 464000, at
*21 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2014) (“Even though the recidivism exception announced in
Almendarez–Torres[] has been eroded, the Supreme Court has not overruled the
exception.”).
17. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 11, United States v. Murray, No.
06-2950-CR, 2006 WL 5251426, at *10 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2006) (noting that
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seems the Supreme Court will eventually need to address the
viability of Almendarez-Torres under Alleyne so that lower courts
can respond to criminal defendants’ challenges with a more
definitive answer in regards to the prior convictions exception.18
By analyzing Almendarez-Torres and its questionable
viability under the Court’s recent holding in Alleyne, this Note
will illustrate that the Supreme Court should not overturn the
prior convictions exception but rather expressly sustain the rule
as good law. Part II of this Note discusses the landscape of
sentencing law by evaluating the history of the Guidelines and
the inherent conflict between the Guidelines and Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. Part III analyzes the Apprendi
revolution and the complicated web of case law that addressed
this constitutional conflict and built today’s criminal sentencing
system. Finally, Part IV argues that Almendarez-Torres should
be upheld for two main reasons: (1) the prior convictions
exception is actually consistent with constitutional principles and
(2) without the prior convictions exception, the criminal justice
system would face administrative burdens that far outweigh any
benefit of overturning the case.
II. History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
judges enjoyed “nearly unlimited discretion” when sentencing
criminal defendants.19 Under this “indeterminate sentencing
system,” the defendant’s sentence was determined not only by the
sentencing criminal defendants under a flawed prior convictions exception
would violate “the fundamental imperative that the Court maintains absolute
fidelity to the protections of the individual afforded by the notice, trial by jury,
and beyond a reasonable doubt requirements” (citing Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13, 27–28 (2005))).
18. See Mike Gottlieb, Reconciling Ceilings and Floors: Alleyne v. United
States, SCOTUSBLOG (June 17, 2013, 9:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2013/06/reconciling-ceilings-and-floors-alleyne-v-united-states/ (last visited Jan.
26, 2015) (discussing the uncertainty of future cases under the holding in
Alleyne and the subsequent possibility of challenges from defendants during the
sentencing process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. Shannon Broderick, Blakely v. Washington Confuses Federal Courts: A
Look into the Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 32 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 243, 244 (2005).
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crime itself but also by the judge’s own discretionary
considerations, such as the character of the individual
defendant.20 The United States Parole Commission was then
given the ultimate authority to determine when the offender was
“sufficiently rehabilitated to merit release.”21 Not surprisingly,
this broad grant of judicial discretion resulted in wide disparities
among sentences for similar crimes: “[T]here undoubtedly are
both Santa Clauses and Scrooges on the bench. An offender’s
punishment should not turn on the luck of the judicial draw or,
worse, on a defense attorney’s ability to maneuver the offender’s
case before a favorable judge.”22 By the early 1970s, disapproval
of this discretionary sentencing system and its uncertain results
grew into to what would become a revolution in sentencing
procedure.23
A. Navigating the Grid: The Mechanics of the Sentencing System
In 1984, President Ronald Reagan introduced a “new era”24 of
criminal justice, signing into law the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (SRA).25 The Act established the United States Sentencing
20. See id. (stating that under the system of indeterminate sentencing, a
judge’s discretion included “any bias or factors” he wished to consider); Todd
Witten, Note, Sentence Entrapment and Manipulation: Government
Manipulation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REV. 697, 699
(1996) (suggesting that as long as the sentence imposed did not exceed broad,
statutory limits, federal judges’ discretion “seemed almost infinite”).
21. William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97
W.VA. L. REV. 373, 378 (1995).
22. Witten, supra note 20, at 700 n.22 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, The
Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 901, 901 (1991)).
23. See Adam Ford, Note, Three Shots into a Black Santa That May
Unwittingly Start an Overhaul of America’s Criminal System: Apprendi v. New
Jersey and the Restructuring of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 12 SETON
HALL L. REV. 249, 252–53 (2001) (“[T]hese factors produced an unusual
coalescence of the left, which cited concern over disparate sentences, and the
right, which charged that the criminals were ‘getting off easy.’ These sides
joined forces to overhaul the entire criminal system in America.”).
24. Impact of Uncle Sam’s New Crime Law, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
50 (Oct. 22, 1984).
25. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559, 3561–3566, 3571–3574, 3581–
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Commission (the Commission),26 which was charged with the
responsibility of promulgating a new, more uniform sentencing
system.27 In 1987, the Commission completed the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual,28 which bound judges to specific ranges of
punishment for particular crimes and required that all facts
relevant to the sentence be found by a preponderance of the
evidence.29 Establishing a “modified real offense” system, the
Commission based the length of an offender’s sentence not only
on the crime itself, but also on an offender’s actual behavior.30
The new guidelines directed the judge to follow a series of steps
involving a formulated sentencing grid to calculate a score that
would indicate the appropriate sentence.31 First, the judge
identified the “base offense level”32 using the statutory index to
3586, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012)); see also Broderick, supra note 19, at 244
(“After enduring sentence disparities for years, President Ronald Reagan
decided to take action to resolve the injustice.”).
26. 98 Stat. at 2017 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012)).
27. See 98 Stat. at 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)
(2012)) (delegating the task of promulgating guidelines for use by a sentencing
court to the Commission, specifically by an affirmative vote of at least four
members); see also David C. Holman, Death by a Thousand Cases: After Booker,
Rita, and Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth Amendment, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267, 271–72 (2008) (mentioning the ambiguity of the Act’s
directives).
28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2004); see Broderick, supra note
19, at 245 (emphasizing that the Guidelines, while not considered actual
statutes, were binding on the courts).
29. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 (“The Commission
believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to
meet due process requirements and policy concerns . . . .”); Eric P. Berlin, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Failure to Eliminate Sentencing Disparity:
Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 187, 187 (1993)
(addressing the Guidelines’ principal aim of curtailing judicial discretion and
establishing a sense of certainty within the sentencing system). The Guidelines
also addressed a shift in the societal view of criminal punishment, replacing
rehabilitation with incapacitation and retribution. See Ford, supra note 23, at
253 (noting an increased belief that the rehabilitation of criminals was
impossible).
30. Bibas, supra note 3, at 1169; see also James E. Felman, The
Fundamental Incompatibility of Real Offense Sentencing Guidelines and the
Federal Criminal Code, 7 FED. SENT. R. 125, 125 (1994) (stating that this type of
system placed more emphasis on what the offender actually did during the
offense).
31. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2004).
32. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(1)–(2).
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locate the statute of conviction.33 The judge subsequently
adjusted the offense level by adding specific offense factors and
any appropriate adjustments listed by the Guidelines.34 Next, the
judge used the Guidelines to calculate the offender’s criminal
history category.35 After determining the base offense level and
the criminal history score, the judge consulted the Guidelines’
sentencing grid to locate the meeting point of the two scores.36
This intersection provided the judge with a range of months for
which the offender could be incarcerated.37 The judge could then
depart from the calculated range by finding unusual factors that
were not adequately considered by the Commission.38 “If the
Commission has done its job as it hopes, the resulting term of
confinement . . . should strike most observers as about the typical
time such an offender would have served prior to the
Guidelines.”39
33. Id.; see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6 (1988).
Justice Breyer used the following scenario to illustrate how a federal judge
should utilize the Guidelines to locate a base offense level: A bank robber with
one serious prior conviction robs a bank of $40,000 while pointing a gun at the
bank teller. Id. Using the index, the judge must look up “Robbery” under § 2B3.1
of the Guidelines. Id. The judge must then locate this section in the Manual and
find the base offense level, which is “Level 18.” Id.
34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(2)–(3). Specific offense
factors are listed under each individual offense section; for example, under
§ 2B2.3 for “Trespass,” the base offense level increases by four levels if the
offense occurred at the White House. Id. § 2B2.3(b)(2). The Guidelines’ third
chapter lists general adjustments; for example, using a minor to commit a crime
increases a base offense level by two levels. Id. § 3B1.4; see also Breyer, supra
note 33, at 6 (continuing the “Robbery” scenario, the base offense level would
increase—based on offense-specific factors—by two levels for the money stolen
and three levels for the use of a gun, thereby amounting to “Level 23”).
35. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(6); see also Breyer, supra note 33, at 6 (continuing the
“Robbery” scenario, § 4A1.1 of the Guidelines would assign three points to the
offender’s criminal history score for one prior serious conviction).
36. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(7).
37. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(8); see also Breyer, supra note 33, at 7 (concluding the
“Robbery” scenario, an offense level of “23” with three points for the offender’s
prior conviction would yield a range of fifty-one to sixty-three months in prison
for the armed robbery by a previously convicted felon).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2012) (allowing the sentencing judge to depart
from the prescribed range upon the finding of “an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission”).
39. Breyer, supra note 33, at 7.
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B. Conflict Between the Guidelines and the Sixth Amendment
Despite the initial support for this sentencing reform,40 the
overly complex and lengthy Sentencing Guidelines quickly fell
into disfavor.41 Critics of the Guidelines, including one of its most
notable architects, Justice Stephen Breyer, denounced the
system’s complicated, mechanical sentencing formula as well as
its excessive provisions and distinctions.42 Other critics attacked
the system’s replacement of deliberation and moral judgment:
“By replacing the case-by-case exercise of human judgment with a
mechanical calculus, we do not judge better or more objectively,
nor do we judge worse. Instead, we cease to judge at all.”43
Most important, and for the purposes of this Note,
application of the new Guidelines revealed a tension between the
sentencing system and the Sixth Amendment. Under the new
sentencing system, the judge made critical findings regarding the
defendant’s conduct in order to calculate an appropriate
sentence—these findings included certain “sentencing factors”
that had the potential to increase the defendant’s statutory
exposure to a longer, more severe sentence.44 These sentencing
40. See M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely
and Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for
Juries, 56 S.C. L. REV. 533, 540 (2005) (noting that liberals and conservatives
alike sponsored the bill, including Senators Kennedy, Hatch, Biden, and
Thurmond).
41. See Linda Greenhouse, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Criticized by a
Key Supporter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998, at A10 (“[P]unishment in federal
courts is . . . marked by a technical language—‘base levels,’ ‘categories,’ ‘points,’
‘scores,’ and so on—that resonates like the jargon of actuaries or tax
accountants . . . .”).
42. See id. (mentioning the dozens of senior federal judges who announced
that they would refuse to hear certain cases based on the severity of the
Guidelines).
43. KATE SMITH & JOSÉ CABRENES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 78, 81–83 (1998); see also Erik Luna,
Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 25, 38–39 (2005) (“The defendant is now a two-dimensional
character . . . his vertical axis an offense level and his horizontal axis a criminal
history category. There is no depth or detail . . . only an initial movement within
the grid pursuant to points or levels . . . .”).
44. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 152 (1997) (“Conduct that is
not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter
into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range.” (citing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2) cmt. background (1987)
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factors appeared both in criminal statutes and in the Guidelines
themselves.45 Criminal statutory enhancements typically
increased the maximum sentence that the judge could impose, or
in some instances, triggered the mandatory minimum sentence.46
Thus, if the judge found that a certain circumstance existed in
connection with the commission of a crime, “the duration of the
defendant’s incarceration would be substantially longer than it
would have been in the absence of the circumstance.”47 The
Guidelines functioned in a similar manner in that “[t]he relevant
conduct provisions [were] designed to channel the sentencing
discretion of the district courts and to make mandatory the
consideration of factors that previously would have been
optional.”48 Examples of such sentencing factors include the
Guidelines’ aforementioned list of adjustments, such as whether
the offense constituted a hate crime,49 and offense-based
characteristics, such as whether the offense involved the reckless
operation of a vehicle.50 Accordingly, if the judge found any such
sentencing factors, he could then increase the defendant’s base
offense level, which would in turn lead to a lengthier sentence
within the prescribed range.51
(amended 2004))).
45. See Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The
Role of Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1135, 1143–44 (2010) (noting that statutory factors are typically mandatory in
that courts must apply them when the facts support the enhancement).
46. See id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012)).
47. Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the
Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 64 (1993).
For example, under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the legislature set a minimum term of ten
years’ imprisonment if a defendant is convicted of knowingly manufacturing or
distributing a controlled substance, for example “1 kilogram or more of a
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)–(b)(1)(A) (2012). If it is found that death or serious bodily injury
resulted from the use of such substances, however, the statutory minimum is
raised to at least twenty years’ imprisonment. Id.
48. Darmer, supra note 40, at 544 n.54 (citing Witte v. United States, 515
U.S. 389, 402 (1995)).
49. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (2004).
50. Id. § 2A1.4(a)(2)(B).
51. See id. § 1B1.1(a)(7) (indicating that the higher the offense level sits on
the sentencing grid’s axis, the higher the sentencing range will spread). The
Court expanded on these sentencing factors in Witte v. United States, explaining
the ways in which the Guidelines and statutes work in tandem:
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Herein lies the central conflict between the Guidelines and
the Sixth Amendment. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines gave
judges the responsibility of finding sentencing factors by a
preponderance of the evidence.52 In certain instances, however,
the judge’s findings would necessarily go beyond the jury’s guilty
verdict or those facts admitted by the defendant at the plea
hearing,53 thereby challenging the long-held assumption that
“proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is
constitutionally required.”54 As Professor Mark Osler has argued,
the defendant’s constitutional rights are lost “when facts are
proven at a lower standard before the judge, rather than beyond a
reasonable doubt before the jury.”55 The Guidelines’ shift away
from jury fact-finding created an obvious conflict between the
jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment and the judge’s
ability to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on factors that
were not found by the jury.56 As expected, this conflict
complicated courts’ navigation of the new, determinate
sentencing system and raised the question of whether these
The relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, like
their criminal history counterparts and the recidivism statutes . . . .
are sentencing enhancement regimes evincing the judgment that a
particular offense should receive a more serious sentence within the
authorized [statutory] range if it was either accompanied by or
preceded by additional criminal activity.
515 U.S. at 402.
52. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (“The
Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is
appropriate to meet due process requirements . . . .”); McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 80 (1986) (“The preponderance standard satisfies due process.
Sentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without
any prescribed burden of proof at all.”).
53. See Darmer, supra note 40, at 544 (“For example, even if the evidence
introduced at trial was limited to powder cocaine, at sentencing the judge may
find that the defendant also distributed heroin in connection with the overall
drug distribution scheme.”).
54. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
55. Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals, the
False Trail of Uniformity and Process, and the Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L. REV.
649, 680 (2003). “Fact-finding was historically a function of trial, and its shift to
sentencing has resulted in an unsettling loss of rights.” Id. at 652.
56. See Broderick, supra note 19, at 251 (describing the issue of whether
the Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment in situations when a judge, not a
jury, finds a fact that leads to an enhanced sentence).
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enhancement factors were simply sentencing factors to be found
by the judge or actual elements of the offense to be found by the
jury.57
As discussed in Part I, this Note focuses on one enhancement
factor
in
particular—prior
convictions.
Recidivist
58
enhancements,
which increase a sentence based on the
defendant’s prior criminal history, are traditionally justified
under the main theories of punishment: “Indeed, the federal
sentencing guidelines, which rely on criminal history to
determine a defendant’s sentencing range, explicitly state that a
defendant’s past criminal conduct is relevant to the four purposes
of sentencing set forth by federal statute: retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”59 As evidenced by the holding
in Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court has carved out a clear
distinction between recidivist enhancements and nonrecidivist
enhancements in the context of sentencing.60 While the Court
57. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000) (addressing
whether the Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury trial guarantees require that
any fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime be charged in an
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Katie
M. McVoy, Note, “What I Have Feared Most Has Now Come to Pass”: Blakely,
Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2005)
(describing how the United States Supreme Court began to cast doubt on the
constitutionality of determinate guidelines systems under the Sixth
Amendment).
58. See Russell, supra note 45, at 1143 (explaining that nonrecidivist
enhancements are those that increase a sentence based on the circumstances of
an offense).
59. Id. at 1150.
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act sets forth four purposes of
sentencing. A defendant’s record of past criminal conduct is directly
relevant to those purposes. A defendant with a record of prior
criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus
deserving of greater punishment. General deterrence of criminal
conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to society that repeated
criminal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each
recurrence. To protect the public from further crimes of the particular
defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and future criminal behavior
must be considered. Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a
limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation.
Id. at 1150 n.78 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1
introductory cmt. (2004)).
60. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998)
(“[T]he lower courts have almost uniformly interpreted statutes (that authorize
higher sentences for recidivists) as setting forth sentencing factors, not as

THE PRIOR CONVICTIONS EXCEPTION

421

ultimately determined that a jury must find any fact that
increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed,61 prior convictions remain unique in that a
judge may find their existence at a lower standard of proof
despite the fact that such a conviction could raise the defendant’s
sentencing range.62 Whether or not this prior convictions
exception remains viable under the Court’s recent holding in
Alleyne v. United States, however, requires a look back at the case
law that has attempted to address this conflict.
III. The Saga of Sentencing Case Law
A. McMillan v. Pennsylvania: Introducing “Sentencing
Enhancements”
One of the first major cases to lay the groundwork for the
Sixth Amendment sentencing debate was McMillan v.
Pennsylvania.63 In this 5–4 decision, the Court coined “the term
‘sentencing factor’ to refer to a fact that was not found by a jury
but that could affect the sentence imposed by the judge.”64 The
creating new crimes . . . .”).
61. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2153 (2013) (claiming
that the Sixth Amendment provides defendants with the right to have a jury
find those nonrecidivist factors beyond a reasonable doubt).
62. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 242 (“[T]he Court said long ago that
a State need not allege a defendant’s prior conviction in the indictment or
information that alleges the elements of an underlying crime.”).
63. 477 U.S. 79 (1986); see also John M. Parese, Putting the Tail Between
the Dog’s Legs: The Danger of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
645, 654 (2002) (referencing Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for
the “Tail of the Dog”: Finding “Elements” of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1999)).
McMillan marked the birth of the “sentencing factor,” a concept that
radically restructured roles of judge and jury by shifting to the court
the ability to make at sentencing, and by a preponderance of the
evidence, factual determinations that, prior to McMillan, had to be
made by juries, at trial, and beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. It is important to note that at the time McMillan was decided, the federal
guidelines system was in its “developmental stages,” and only a few states had
sentencing guidelines of their own. NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING
LAW AND POLICY 450 (3d ed. 2013).
64. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 485 (2000).
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case involved a challenge to Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act,65 which required a mandatory minimum sentence
of five years if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant “visually possessed a firearm” during the
commission of certain underlying offenses.66 The statute further
provided that “visible possession” was not an element of the crime
but rather a sentencing factor.67 In determining whether the
prosecution must prove the possession factor beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Court relied on Patterson v. New York,68 a fundamental
case in the debate surrounding constitutional sentencing
procedures.69 Patterson placed great weight on the state
legislature’s duty to define crimes and prescribe penalties: “It
goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is
much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal
Government.”70 Under Patterson, the legislature’s definition of
the crime is usually dispositive, and therefore the prosecution
need only prove those elements included in the definition of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.71
In keeping with Patterson, the McMillan Court held that “a
State may treat visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing
factor rather than an element of the offense that must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”72 The Pennsylvania legislature
expressly provided that visual possession was a sentencing
consideration, not an element of the offense.73 The fact that the
65. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
66. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79 (noting that the sentencing factor was
meant to prevent judges from imposing a sentence of less than five years for the
underlying felony).
67. See id. (stating that the possession factor does not authorize a sentence
in excess of that otherwise allowed, or in other words, in excess of the maximum
prescribed sentence).
68. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
69. See Jason E. Barsanti, Note, Ring v. Arizona: The Sixth and Eighth
Amendments Collide: Out of the Wreckage Emerges a Constitutional Safeguard
for Capital Defendants, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 519, 530 (2004) (claiming that
Patterson v. New York played an “integral” role in the decisions of Apprendi v.
New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona).
70. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201 (referencing Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 134 (1954)).
71. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (referencing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210).
72. Id. at 79.
73. See id. at 88 (stating that there was no indication that the statute had
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legislature decided to base the severity of the sentence on the
presence (or absence) of a particular fact did not automatically
make that fact an “element” of the offense.74 Rather, the visual
possession factor “[came] into play only after the defendant [had]
been found guilty of one of the enumerated crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt.”75 Additionally, the provision at issue only
raised the mandatory minimum sentence, thereby limiting the
sentencing court to a penalty already within the range that
otherwise applied.76
In response to the defendants’ Sixth Amendment claim (that
the jury must determine all ultimate facts concerning the offense
committed), the Court reiterated that the Pennsylvania
legislature is free to treat visible possession as a sentencing
consideration, and as a result, there is no right to jury
sentencing, even if the sentence turns on a specific finding of
fact.77 The McMillan Court did maintain, however, that there are
constitutional limits to a state’s power to define the elements of a
criminal offense.78 Justice Stevens elaborated on these
constitutional limitations in his dissent, claiming that “[i]f a
State provides that a specific component of a prohibited
transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a
special punishment, that component must be treated as a ‘fact
necessary to constitute the crime.’”79 Justice Stevens further
argued that the criminally accused are owed a level of “accurate
factfinding” and that by allowing a state legislature to disregard
such safeguards, the Court violates the beyond-a-reasonable“been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags
the dog of the substantive offense”).
74. See id. at 79 (referencing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214).
75. Id. at 79–80 (emphasis added).
76. See id. at 87–88 (making special note of the fact that the statute did not
raise the maximum penalty for the crime, a distinction that proves significant in
future sentencing cases).
77. See id. (referencing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984)).
78. See id. at 86 (“[I]n certain limited circumstances Winship’s reasonabledoubt requirement applies to facts not formally identified as elements of the
offense charged.”). The McMillan Court did not specifically identify, however,
what kind of legislative action would run afoul of those limits. See id. (noting
that the Court would not attempt to precisely define those constitutional limits
as mentioned in Patterson).
79. Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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doubt standard of In re Winship.80 Justice Stevens would revisit
and remedy these same concerns fourteen years later when
writing the majority opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey.81
B. Almendarez-Torres v. United States
Twelve years after McMillan, the Court continued its
assessment of determinate sentencing in Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, this time in the context of recidivist
enhancements. According to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a),82 it is unlawful
for a deported alien to reenter the United States without special
permission.83 Violation of § 1326(a) triggers a maximum term of
two years’ imprisonment.84 Subsection (b)(2) provides for a
maximum term of twenty years’ imprisonment if the alien’s
deportation is “subsequent to a conviction for commission of an
aggravated felony.”85 Defendant Hugo Almendarez-Torres pled
guilty to violating § 1326, having been deported pursuant to three
convictions for aggravated felonies and subsequently reentering
the United States without authorization.86 The district court
sentenced
Almendarez-Torres
to
eighty-five
months’
imprisonment under the applicable Guidelines range, and he
appealed.87 Almendarez-Torres argued that the Government was
required to allege his prior convictions in the indictment and
prove those convictions beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.88
Given that the indictment failed to include his aggravated felony
80. See id. at 102 (“It would demean the importance of the reasonabledoubt standard—indeed, it would demean the Constitution itself—if the
substance of the standard could be avoided by nothing more than a legislative
declaration that prohibited conduct is not an ‘element’ of a crime.”).
81. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 467 (2000) (reiterating the
constitutional limits to “[s]tates’ authority to define away facts necessary to
constitute a criminal offense” (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–88)).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1326(b)(2).
86. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 224 (1998).
87. Id. at 224.
88. See id. at 223 (referencing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117
(1974), which provided that an indictment must set forth each element of the
crime charged).
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convictions, Almendarez-Torres claimed that the court could only
invoke the maximum imprisonment of two years as authorized by
§ 1326.89 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s sentence,
and a closely divided Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that
Congress may treat a recidivist enhancement based on a
defendant’s prior convictions as a sentencing factor, rather than
an element of the crime.90 The Court therefore determined that
subsection (b)(2) was not an element of the crime but rather a
penalty provision to be found by a preponderance of the evidence
by a judge.91
Like McMillan, the Almendarez-Torres Court was split 5–4,
with the narrow majority consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer.92 Writing
for the Court, Justice Breyer approached the sentencing issue as
one of statutory construction.93 The majority first looked to the
subject matter of the statute (recidivism) to determine whether
Congress intended for subsection (b)(2) to constitute an element
of the crime or a sentencing factor.94 Emphasizing the wellestablished tradition of recidivism, the Court maintained that the
prior commission of a serious crime “is as typical a sentencing
factor as one might imagine,”95 and consequently, lower courts
have “almost uniformly” interpreted statutes that increase
sentences for recidivists as providing sentencing factors, rather
89. See id. at 227 (noting that two years’ imprisonment was the maximum
penalty authorized for an offender without a prior conviction).
90. See id. at 225 (stating that a legislature’s decision to treat recidivism as
a sentencing factor does not exceed constitutional limits on the legislature’s
authority to define the elements of a crime).
91. See id. at 224–25 (concluding that the prosecution did not need to allege
the defendant’s prior convictions in the indictment or prove said convictions to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to trigger the enhancement of the
statutory maximum).
92. See id. at 226 (listing the division of votes).
93. See Bibas, supra note 3, at 1108 (suggesting that the holding in
Almendarez-Torres turned on congressional intent, given that legislatures
traditionally define the elements of an offense as provided in McMillan).
94. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228–29 (explaining that while an
indictment must set forth all elements of the crime charged, it need not allege
factors only relevant to the sentencing procedure (citing Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974))).
95. See id. at 230 (listing various statutes that mandate increased
sentences for recidivists).
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than elements of the offense.96 After reaffirming its endorsement
of this longstanding tradition,97 the Court then turned its
attention to an examination of the statute’s language.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, subsection (a) provides that, “subject
to subsection (b),”98 any alien who has been deported and since
reentered the United States illegally shall be fined or imprisoned
for no more than two years.99 Subsection (b)(2) provides that,
“notwithstanding subsection (a),”100 any alien as described in
subsection (a) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction
for commission of an aggravated felony shall be fined or
imprisoned no more than twenty years.101 The majority concluded
that the phrases “subject to subsection (b)” and “notwithstanding
subsection (a)” clearly demonstrate that Congress intended for
the crime set forth in subsection (a) to be “subject to”
subsection (b)’s enhanced penalties when the alien is also a
felon.102 If Congress had intended for subsection (b) to set forth
substantive crimes, it would make little sense to include the
phrases “subject to” and “notwithstanding.”103
The majority also pointed to the circumstances surrounding
subsection (b)’s adoption. When Congress added subsection (b) to
§ 1326 in 1988, the original language of subsection (a) was as
follows: “Any alien who has been . . . deported . . . and thereafter
enters . . . the United States . . . shall be guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not
more than two years . . . .”104 Examining this operative language,
the majority noted that at the time of the amendment,
96. See id. (referencing a string of cases that support the traditional
interpretation of recidivism as a sentencing factor, not an offense element).
97. See Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 629 (1912) (concluding that
recidivism speaks to the punishment of the offense, rather than the
commission).
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 1326(b)(2).
101. Id.
102. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1998)
(citing § 1326).
103. See id. (stating that federal courts have always presumed that
Congress did not intend for a defendant to be cumulatively punished for two
crimes where one is a lesser included offense of the other).
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1988) (emphasis added) (amended 1990).
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subsection (a) addressed the offender’s guilt, while subsection (b)
referred only to punishment, thereby indicating that Congress
solely intended to implement a sentencing consideration.105 While
the dissent argued that Congress eventually struck the
aforementioned language (“shall be guilty of . . .”) from
subsection (a) pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1990,106 the
majority maintained that the 1990 amendment was merely a
housekeeping matter and did not suggest any intention to change
the relationship between subsection (a) and subsection (b).107
Moreover, the heading of subsection (b), “Criminal penalties for
reentry of certain deported aliens,”108 further supported the
majority’s interpretation.109 While a title containing the word
“penalties” is not necessarily dispositive, the majority argued that
legislative history demonstrates that Congress intentionally
drafted subsection (b) to signal a provision that addresses
penalties, rather than a substantive crime.110
Finally, the majority concluded that any contrary
interpretation would “risk unfairness.”111 If subsection (b)
provided for a separate crime, rather than a sentencing factor,
the Government would need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
105. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 232–34.
Although one could read the language, “any alien described in
[subsection (a)],” standing alone, as importing subsection (a)’s
elements into new offenses defined in subsection (b) . . . it seems more
likely that Congress simply meant to “describe” an alien who, in the
words of the 1988 statute, was “guilty of a felony” defined in
subsection (a) and “convict[ed] thereof.”
Id.
106. Pub. L. No. 100-649, 104 Stat. 5059 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (2012)).
107. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 233–34 (explaining that the
amendment to subsection (a) was one of many amendments under the
Immigration Act of 1990 meant to “uniformly” simplify the phrasing of various
penalty provisions in the Immigration and Naturalization Act).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (emphasis added).
109. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 324 (claiming that the heading of a
section is helpful in resolving doubts regarding the meaning of a statute
(referencing Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519 (1947))).
110. See id. (listing various legislative records referring to subsection (b) as
a penalty scheme). “The statutory language is somewhat complex. But after
considering the matter in context, we believe the interpretative circumstances
point significantly in one direction.” Id. at 238.
111. Id. at 234.
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to a jury that the defendant was deported subsequent to a
conviction for an aggravated felony.112 Introducing evidence of the
defendant’s prior convictions, however, would risk significant
prejudice.113 The majority noted that even if a defendant’s
stipulation concealed the name and the details of the prior
offense from the jury, “the government is entitled to prove a prior
felony offense through introduction of probative evidence.”114
Thus, jurors would ultimately discover (whether from the
indictment, the judge, or the prosecutor) that the defendant
committed an aggravated felony.115 The majority, therefore,
concluded that Congress, in adding subsection (b) to § 1326, could
not have intended “to create this kind of unfairness in respect to
facts that are almost never contested.”116 While the majority did
not spend a significant amount of time discussing this issue, the
risk of prejudice would remain one of the chief factors preserving
the recidivist exception in Almendarez-Torres.117 As argued in the
final section of this Note, the risk of prejudice may in fact be an
integral reason to uphold Almendarez-Torres as good law postAlleyne.
After examining the statute itself, the majority turned its
attention to reconciling Almendarez-Torres with the Court’s
reasoning in McMillan v. United States. While the two cases are
similar in many ways,118 they also differ in two major respects.
112. Id. at 234–35.
113. See id. at 235 (noting that, as the Court concluded in Old Chief v.
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997), the “nature” of the prior offense would
inevitably give rise to prejudice).
114. See id. at 235 (referencing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 192,
178–79 (1997) (citing United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690 (9th Cir.
1993))).
115. See id. (suggesting that evidence of Almendarez-Torres’s aggravated
felony would unfairly influence the jury).
116. See id. (implying that the presence of prior convictions is rarely
contested).
117. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 521 (2000) (stating that one
of the most common reasons for treating recidivism differently, as demonstrated
in Almendarez-Torres, is the concern for prejudicing the jury by introducing
evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction(s)); Gaston, supra note 12, at 1179
(acknowledging that a defendant’s prior convictions might make him
unsympathetic to a jury, especially considering the Founders’ intent for the
Sixth Amendment).
118. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 242–43 (noting, for example, that
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The majority first pointed to the traditional role of recidivism as
opposed to possession of a firearm: “[T]he Court said long ago
that a State need not allege a defendant’s prior conviction in the
indictment or information that alleges the elements of an
underlying crime, even though the conviction was ‘necessary to
bring the case within the statute.’”119 Echoed throughout
Almendarez-Torres, the majority reiterated that recidivism is
possibly the most well-established basis for enhancing an
offender’s penalty; to label recidivism as an “element” of the
offense would “mark an abrupt departure” from this tradition of
treating recidivism as a sentencing factor.120
The majority then addressed the second major difference
between McMillan and Almendarez-Torres, that unlike the
Pennsylvania statute in McMillan, § 1326(b) triggered an
increase in the maximum penalty, rather than the minimum, and
created a wider range of punishment.121 The majority concluded,
however, that this difference did not affect the “constitutional
outcome” of the case.122 The increase of a mandatory maximum
penalty carries no more, if not less, risk of unfairness than the
increase in a mandatory minimum; as Justice Stevens warned in
McMillan, a mandatory minimum actually has the capacity to
“mandate a minimum sentence of imprisonment more than twice
as severe as the maximum the trial judge would otherwise have
imposed.”123 Because the McMillan Court did not rest its ultimate
decision upon the aforementioned distinction, the difference
between maximum and minimum penalties was not
neither statute at issue transgressed the limits set forth in Patterson and that
both “simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing
courts to bear on punishment . . . and dictated the precise weight to be given
that factor” (citing McMillan v. United States, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986))).
119. Id. at 243 (citing Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624 (1912)).
120. See id. at 244 (referencing Graham, 224 U.S. at 629).
121. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012) (raising the maximum penalty from
two years’ imprisonment to twenty years’ imprisonment for those aliens who
were deported pursuant to a prior aggravated felony), with 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 9712 (1982) (raising the mandatory minimum sentence to five years’
imprisonment for visible possession of a firearm).
122. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243; see also Bibas, supra note 3, at
1109 (stating that this difference actually favored the defendants).
123. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244–45 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 95
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). A mandatory minimum can essentially eliminate all of
the sentencing judge’s discretion. Id. at 245.
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determinative in Almendarez-Torres.124 Finally, the majority
concluded that McMillan further supported the conclusion that
Congress has the constitutional power to treat a fact, such as the
prior conviction of an aggravated felony, as a sentencing factor,
rather than an element of the crime.125
Justice Breyer closed the opinion by briefly responding to
Almendarez-Torres’s final argument—that any significant
increase in a statutory maximum sentence should trigger a
“constitutional elements requirement.”126 The Court quickly
rejected this theory, stating that such a requirement would be
inconsistent given the existing case law that allows a judge,
rather than a jury, to determine certain factors that may expose a
defendant to the death penalty, “a punishment far more severe
than that faced by petitioner here.”127 Interestingly, critics of the
recidivist exception would later employ this death penalty
argument against the precedent of Almendarez-Torres.128
While the majority’s analysis of recidivist enhancements is
instrumental in understanding the various rationales behind the
Almendarez-Torres exception, the vigorous dissent of Justice
Scalia (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg)
arguably plays an even more paramount role in the conflict
between recidivist enhancements and the Sixth Amendment’s
jury trial guarantee. The dissent in Almendarez-Torres signaled
what would evolve into a decade-long movement away from the
124. See id. at 245 (noting that while the McMillan Court claimed that the
defendant’s argument would have had “more superficial appeal” if the
sentencing factor triggered a greater or additional punishment, the statement
meant no more than that—superficial appeal).
125. See id. at 246 (claiming that the Court in McMillan established that the
Constitution permits a legislature to require a longer sentence for gun
possession, thereby suggesting the same for recidivism).
126. Id. at 247.
127. See id. (referencing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)); Hildwin v.
Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); and Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 477 (1984)).
128. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 584 (2002) (overruling Walton v.
Arizona to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge to find an aggravating
circumstance necessary for the death penalty). The Court eventually revoked
the authority of sentencing judges to find those factors necessary to trigger the
death penalty, thereby chipping away at one of the pillars of Almendarez-Torres.
See id. at 585 (suggesting that a jury, not a judge, is the correct adjudicatory
body to find any element, including those aggravating factors triggering the
death penalty, that bring about a greater offense).
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judicial fact-finding of determinate sentencing procedures.129
Focusing in large part on the constitutional questions stemming
from the majority’s statutory interpretation, the dissent
effectively foreshadowed the Sixth Amendment challenges that
would consume the Court during the Apprendi revolution.130 The
dissent first argued that the statute at issue, § 1326, was
ambiguous on its face as to whether subsection (b)(2) constituted
an entirely separate offense or a mere sentencing enhancement
as indicated by the majority.131 “‘[W]here a statute is susceptible
of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.’”132
According to the dissent, the majority’s interpretation of § 1326,
which allows a judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, to
determine a fact that increases a defendant’s maximum penalty
undeniably triggers the “constitutional doubt” canon.133

129. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2153 (2013) (holding that
“any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be
submitted to the jury”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005)
(concluding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are hereinafter advisory
guidelines, rather than mandatory); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304
(2004) (solidifying the Apprendi rule); Ring, 536 U.S. at 584 (overruling Walton
v. Arizona, and, as a result, a sentencing judge’s authority to find aggravating
circumstances that trigger the death penalty); Apprendi v. United States, 530
U.S. 466, 466 (2000) (holding that “[t]he Constitution requires that any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum . . . must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt”).
130. See Gaston, supra note 12, at 1171 (stating that in later cases, for
example Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington, the Court would
openly repudiate much of Almendarez-Torres and seek a broader interpretation
of the right to a jury).
131. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that in prior cases addressing the issue of sentencing enhancements, the
statutes in question “unambiguously relieved the prosecution of the burden of
proving a critical fact to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt”). In McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, the statute at issue specifically provided that visible possession of
a firearm “shall not be an element of the crime,” but rather “shall be determined
at sentencing . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.” 477 U.S. 79, 81 n.1 (1986)
(citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(b) (1982)).
132. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)).
133. Id. at 251.
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Therefore, the Court should have read subsection (b)(2) as a
separate offense, rather than a sentencing factor.134
In order to illustrate this “constitutional doubt,” the dissent
pointed to a string of relevant case law addressing the extent to
which the Constitution prohibits the reallocation of burdens of
proof in criminal cases.135 Paying special attention to the Court’s
most recent case, McMillan v. Pennsylvania,136 the dissent
emphasized the distinction between statutes that enhance the
permissible maximum penalty and statutes that prescribe a
minimum sentence.137 The dissent reasoned that the
Pennsylvania law in McMillan fell within constitutional limits
because it did not heighten the maximum penalty for the crime
committed; rather, it functioned solely to keep the court’s penalty
within the range already available.138 The Court in McMillan
specifically recognized, however, that the outcome may have been
different if the statute had triggered an increase in the maximum
penalty.139 While the majority maintained that this distinction
actually strengthens the constitutionality of § 1326 “because an
increase of the minimum sentence (rather than the permissible
maximum) is more disadvantageous to the defendant,”140 the
dissent summarily replied that the McMillan Court not only
rejected this position, but also based its holding on the “converse”

134. See id. at 249 (concluding that subsection (b)(2) is a separate offense
that includes the violation in subsection (a) but adds the element of prior felony
conviction).
135. See id. at 251–58 (discussing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977); and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)).
136. See id. at 256 (“[N]o one can read McMillan, our latest opinion on the
point, without perceiving that the determinative element in our validation of the
Pennsylvania statute was the fact that it merely limited the sentencing judge’s
discretion within the range of penalty already available, rather than
substantially increasing the available sentence.”).
137. See id. at 253 (noting that McMillan did not involve an increase of the
maximum penalty such as the statute in Almendarez-Torres).
138. See id. (referencing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87–88).
139. See id. (reiterating the McMillan Court’s suggestion that the argument
for a separate element would have had “at least more superficial appeal” if the
factor in question, visible possession of a firearm, exposed the defendants to a
heightened punishment (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88)).
140. Id. at 254.
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conclusion.141 Moreover, the dissent provided a list of cases in
which state supreme courts determined that a prior conviction
increasing the charged crime’s maximum punishment must be
considered an element of the offense.142
The dissent next addressed the majority’s discussion of the
tradition of recidivism, noting that it was “near uniform practice”
among states to treat prior convictions as elements of a separate
offense when the statute in question creates a greater maximum
sentence for crimes committed by convicted felons.143 The dissent
further stressed that the Court’s special treatment of recidivism
not only lacked a rational basis, but also transgressed the limits
of common law.144 Listing a host of cases in support, the dissent
emphasized that under common law, the fact of prior convictions
must be charged in the same indictment as the underlying crime
and submitted to the jury for determination.145 The dissent also
discussed, albeit more briefly, the majority’s textual misreading
of § 1326 and the statute’s legislative history. The dissent argued
that the statute in its current form actually undermined the
majority’s interpretation—why would the legislature eliminate
the statute’s decisive language (“shall be guilty of a felony”)

141. Id.
142. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 106 N.W. 187, 188 (1906) (“By the uniform
current of authority, the fact of the prior convictions is to be taken as part of the
offense instantly charged, at least to the extent of aggravating it and
authorizing an increased punishment.”); Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 68 Mass. 505,
506 (1854) (concluding that a prior conviction increasing the maximum sentence
must be set forth in the indictment).
143. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “While
several states later altered this procedure by providing a separate proceeding
for the determination of prior convictions, at least as late as 1965 all but eight
retained the defendant’s right to a jury determination on this issue.” Id.
144. See id. (stating that the majority mistakes the issue in this case for
whether a prior felony conviction is typically used as a sentencing factor).
145. See id. (referencing, for example, Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563
(1967) and Massey v. United States, 281 F. 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1922), and
questioning why the majority was unable to find any statutes making recidivism
an element of the crime); Brent E. Newton, Almendarez-Torres and the Anders
Ethical Dilemma, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 747, 771 (2008) (noting that, although the
Court had never directly addressed the issue set forth in Almendarez-Torres, the
Court had previously resolved similar questions in favor of the defendants when
a disputed fact increased the maximum punishment).
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classifying subsection (a) as a crime, if not to make both
subsections parallel?146
Finally, the dissent addressed the majority’s “inherent
unfairness argument” regarding the prejudice of prior
convictions.147 While it would certainly be unfair to reveal the
existence of prior felony convictions to the jury, it would be
equally, if not more, unfair to take away the defendant’s right to
a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt on the question
of prior conviction.148 Looking at the congressional intent, the
dissent stressed that Congress more likely agreed with the
traditional practice of the aforementioned common law rather
than with current policy judgments regarding prejudice when
drafting this statute.149 Regardless of Congress’s intent, the
dissent maintained that the very notion that “jury infection”
trumps the defendant’s right to a jury verdict secured by a
reasonable-doubt standard is unsound.150
While Justice Scalia never definitively declared that the
Constitution requires a jury to find the existence of a prior
146. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 264 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[B]oth subsections say that the individuals they describe “shall be
fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than [2, 10, or 20] years.”
If this suffices to define a substantive offense in subsection (a) (as all
agree it does), it is hard to see why it would not define a substantive
offense in each paragraph of subsection (b) as well.
Id.
147. See id. at 267 (describing the prejudice of bringing the existence of a
prior felony conviction to the jury).
148. See id. (stating that the majority incorrectly assessed the risk of
prejudice as the greater disadvantage).
149. See id. at 267–68 (noting that the majority’s preference for judicial factfinding of prior convictions conflicts with “the manner in which recidivism laws
have historically been treated in this country”); see, e.g., United States v. Texas,
507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (discussing the longstanding principle that when
statutes violate the common law, they must be read with “a presumption
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles”); Norfolk
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 464
U.S. 30, 34–35 (1983) (concluding that the Uniform Relocation Act did not
change the “long-established common law principle” that a utility forced to
relocate from a public right-of-way must cover its own expenses).
150. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 268 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that the majority’s assertion relies on the assumption that the fact of prior
convictions is rarely contested, which is inaccurate, according to the dissent,
especially in the case of an illegal reentry alien statute).
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conviction, he made clear the constitutional doubt surrounding
the majority’s exception to such a rule 151: “I think it beyond
question that there was, until today’s unnecessary resolution of
the point, ‘serious doubt’ whether the Constitution permits a
defendant’s sentencing exposure to be increased tenfold on the
basis of a fact that is not charged, tried to a jury, and found
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 152 Only one year after the holding
in Almendarez-Torres, the dissent’s concerns would begin to
take shape in the form of an emerging constitutional rule, first
foreshadowed by Jones v. United States,153 and later solidified
by Apprendi v. New Jersey.
C. Apprendi v. New Jersey and Its Revival of Jury Fact-finding
In Jones v. United States, the Court construed the
provisions of a federal carjacking statute 154 that established
higher penalties for the offense if it resulted in death or serious
bodily injury as elements of the offense rather than sentencing
factors.155 The Court overturned the defendant’s sentence of
twenty-five years, which had been enhanced from a maximum
of fifteen years after the district court found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that serious bodily injury
resulted from the defendant’s crime. 156 This holding marked
the beginning of a crucial shift in sentencing jurisprudence. 157
151. See id. at 260 (“I do not endorse that position as necessarily correct . . . .
What I have tried to establish . . . is that on the basis of our jurisprudence to
date, the answer to the constitutional question is not clear.”).
152. Id.
153. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2012).
155. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 227 (holding that § 2119 establishes three
separate offenses, each of which must be charged by indictment, proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury); DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63,
at 464 (suggesting that § 2119 created separate crimes because “several related
subsections defined increasing maximum penalty levels if the offense resulted in
serious bodily injury”).
156. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 251–52 (stating that affirming the enhanced
maximum sentence would “raise serious constitutional questions on which
precedent is not dispositive”).
157. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1295 (5th ed. 2013) (noting that the Court’s dictum in Jones would evolve into a
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A “mirror image” 158 of Almendarez-Torres, the majority in Jones
evaluated a similar federal statute but arrived at the opposite
conclusion, “recast[ing] what looked like a sentencing factor into
a traditional element of an offense.”159 While the Court in Jones
insisted that it was merely interpreting a federal statute, not
proposing a constitutional rule,160 it undoubtedly foreshadowed
an emerging principle that would consume the Court’s attention
during the next decade-long wave of sentencing reform.161
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court solidified the shift away
from judicial fact-finding foreshadowed in Jones by taking what
was a mere footnote162 and setting forth a pivotal constitutional
rule that would forever change the country’s sentencing
system.163 The Court addressed a New Jersey “hate crime”
statute prescribing a greater term of imprisonment for any crime
when the trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,
“constitutional holding” in Apprendi).
158. Bibas, supra note 3, at 1115.
159. DEMLEITNER, supra note 63, at 464.
Four members of the Almendarez-Torres majority repeated their
arguments in dissent in Jones. They wanted to defer to legislatures,
stressed traditional leeway for judicial fact-finding at sentencing, and
forecast that the elements rule would cause grave practical problems.
Conversely, the Jones majority copied the Almendarez-Torres dissent.
These Justices distrusted legislatures and judges, exalted juries,
relied on traditions of jury fact-finding, and adopted a strong rule of
construction to avoid constitutional doubts.
Bibas, supra note 3, at 1115.
160. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 252 n.11 (claiming that the holding does not set
forth any new principle of constitutional law, but rather construes a federal
statute “in light of a set of constitutional concerns that have emerged through a
series of our decisions over the past quarter century”).
161. See id. at 243 n.6 (“[A]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because our prior
cases suggest rather than establish this principle, our concern . . . rises only to
the level of doubt, not certainty.”); DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 157, at 1294
(suggesting that the holding in Jones would have been far less instrumental had
the Court not introduced the aforementioned constitutional principle).
162. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (quoting footnote 6 of the
Jones opinion).
163. See R. Craig Green, Apprendi’s Limits, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1155, 1157
(2005) (describing Apprendi v. New Jersey as a “landmark” decision in modern
sentencing law); Bibas, supra note 3, at 1122 (stating that “Apprendi is Jones
taken to its logical conclusion”).
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that the defendant “acted with a purpose to intimidate an
individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender,
handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity” while
committing the crime.164 After determining that Apprendi, who
had been charged with second-degree possession of a firearm for
an unlawful purpose, violated the state’s hate crime statute, the
trial court increased the original sentence of ten years (for the
underlying offense) to twenty years.165 In a predictable 5–4
split,166 the Court held that “[t]he Constitution requires that any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction,
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”167 Professor Stephanos Bibas perfectly describes the
majority’s core reasoning in the following way: “The majority once
again exalted jury fact-finding, relied heavily on historical
arguments about juries’ traditional role, and refused to trust
judges or legislators. The Court feared the erosion of jury trials
and also hinted at the need to give fair notice to defendants of
enhancements.”168
The majority emphasized that when assessing whether a
factor is an element of a separate crime (thereby triggering a jury
determination beyond a reasonable doubt) or merely a sentencing
enhancement (thereby triggering a judicial determination by a
preponderance of the evidence), the central issue is not one of
form, but rather one of effect: if a “sentencing element” exposes
the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by
the jury’s verdict, then that factor should constitute an element of
a separate offense, regardless of the state’s labeling of that
factor.169 In establishing this brightline rule, the Court
164. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44–3(e) (West 1999–2000).
165. Apprendi v. United States, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000).
166. See Gaston, supra note 12, at 1167–68 (noting that the narrow majority
in Apprendi marked a return to the Framers’ intent that the Sixth Amendment
should protect individuals from an “over-punitive” government). It is important
to note that the dissent in Apprendi was comprised of the majority in
Almendarez-Torres with the exception of Justice Thomas, thereby reflecting a
shift on the bench towards a revival of the jury’s role in sentencing procedures.
Id.
167. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added).
168. Bibas, supra note 3, at 1122.
169. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (suggesting that labels are not
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distinguished its holding from McMillan v. Pennsylvania, noting
that, unlike Apprendi, McMillan did not involve the enhancement
of a statutory maximum but rather the enhancement of a
mandatory minimum within a statutory range.170
One of the most important implications of the Court’s holding
was that it articulated a seemingly clear exception for prior
convictions.171 The Court referenced the traditional role of
recidivism exalted by the Almendarez-Torres majority172 and
noted that the procedural safeguards attached to a fact of prior
conviction mitigated any Sixth Amendment concerns.173 However,
while the majority appeared to uphold the recidivism exception as
good law, the Apprendi Court ultimately marked the first major
crack in the Almendarez-Torres foundation, calling into question
the prior convictions exception and its constitutionality under the
Sixth Amendment:
Even though it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was
incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our
reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were
contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision’s validity
and we need not revisit it for purposes of our decision today to
treat the case as a narrow exception to the general rule we
recalled at the outset. Given its unique facts, it surely does not
warrant rejection of the otherwise uniform course of decision
during the entire history of our jurisprudence.174

definitive); McVoy, supra note 57, at 1617 (“If the fact does indeed expose the
defendant to greater punishment, judicial factfinding is constitutionally
infirm.”).
170. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486–87 (perpetuating the distinction between
the enhancement of a mandatory minimum sentence and the enhancement of a
mandatory maximum sentence).
171. See id. at 487 (stating that Almendarez-Torres “represents at best an
exceptional departure from the historic practice that we have described”
(emphasis added)).
172. See id. at 488 (explaining that “recidivism . . . is a traditional, if not the
most traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an offender’s
sentence” (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244
(1998))).
173. See id. (noting that Almendarez-Torres did not question the accuracy of
the fact of his prior conviction).
174. Id. at 489–90.
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Justice Thomas echoed the majority’s doubt in his concurrence.175
While originally part of the Almendarez-Torres majority, Justice
Thomas claimed that the Court, including himself, had based too
much of its justification for the recidivist exception on the fact
that a prior conviction was traditionally a basis for a heightened
sentence.176 “What matters is the way by which a fact enters into
the sentence. If a fact is by law the basis for imposing or
increasing punishment—for establishing or increasing the
prosecution’s entitlement—it is an element.”177 Justice Thomas’s
commentary on Almendarez-Torres was especially significant in
that it signaled a shift in the Court’s composition of those
Justices supporting the prior convictions exception and those
questioning its validity.178
As was the case in Almendarez-Torres, the dissent in
Apprendi was equally important in foreshadowing the
forthcoming issues of the sentencing revolution. The divide
between the majority and dissent in Apprendi has been described
as one between “the formalist and the functional”;179 while the
majority focused on the Founders’ intent to secure the right to a
jury, the dissent seemed more concerned with the practical issues
resulting from the Court’s new rule.180 “For one . . . juries may be
prejudiced just by hearing of enhancements, let alone hearing
evidence about them. For another, defendants face difficulties
arguing alternative, inconsistent defenses to juries.”181 The
175. See id. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring) (joining the opinion of the Court
but advocating for a broader constitutional rule).
176. See id. (noting that this approach “defines away the real issue”).
177. Id. at 521.
178. Compare Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226 (1998)
(joining in the opinion of the Court were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, and dissenting were Justices Stevens,
Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg), with Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468 (joining in the
opinion of the Court were Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg, and dissenting were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Breyer).
179. Gaston, supra note 12, at 1172.
180. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550–52 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the majority’s new rule has left judges “in a state of limbo”); Bibas, supra
note 3, at 1123 (claiming that the dissenters were right to worry about the
compromises to judicial efficiency given the problems this new rule will cause at
trial and on habeas corpus).
181. Bibas, supra note 3, at 1142–43.
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dissenters also took issue with the majority’s historical analysis,
emphasizing that legislatures have traditionally had broad
discretion in defining crimes and punishment, while judges have
traditionally had broad discretion in sentencing procedures.182
Arguably one of the most significant criticisms, however, was the
damage that the Apprendi holding would have on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.183 Despite the intention to protect
defendants from the arbitrary and unbridled discretion of judges,
the majority’s new rule seemed to invalidate as unconstitutional
those efforts by Congress and state legislatures to eliminate such
judicial abuse through the implementation of determinate
sentencing systems.184 Thus, while the majority opinion did not
expressly invalidate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the
holding seemed to signal an impending demise in the progress of
determinate sentencing.185 With the sentencing revolution well
182. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 525–29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming
that the majority’s broad rule is unsupported by history and prior decisions of
the Court); Parese, supra note 63, at 680–81 (emphasizing the importance of
respecting the will of the legislature and its authority to create procedural
systems for the administration of justice). The majority’s historical
interpretation especially attacked the well-established role of judges in capital
sentencing. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522–23 (majority opinion) (questioning
whether the unique nature of capital crimes is sufficient to place such
sentencing outside the reach of the majority’s new rule in Apprendi). This issue
took shape in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), when the Court concluded
that under the holding in Apprendi, “[c]apital defendants, no less than
noncapital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on
which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.”
Ring, 536 U.S. at 589. This holding effectively eliminated the “death penalty
argument” in favor of upholding Almendarez-Torres. See Almendarez-Torres,
523 U.S. at 247 (supporting the prior convictions exception by referencing a
judge’s right in capital cases to find those factors underlying the death
sentence).
183. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming that
the Court’s holding “invalidate[s] with the stroke of a pen three decades’ worth
of nationwide reform, all in the name of a principle with a questionable
constitutional pedigree”).
184. See id. at 550–51 (warning that the majority’s implications regarding
the debatable constitutionality of determinate sentencing would unleash “a flood
of petitions” from convicted defendants hoping to set aside their sentences); see
also Bibas, supra note 3, at 1139 (claiming that the majority’s new elements rule
not only rests on a “premature distrust of legislatures, but also is likely to
increase arbitrariness by giving prosecutors more power”).
185. See Green, supra note 163, at 1161 (stating that the Guidelines could
survive only if the Court’s logic were limited to statutory maxima); Ford, supra
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the Court would continue to carve back judicial factthe sentencing process over the next several years,
case bolstering the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
gradually wearing down the Almendarez-Torres

D. Blakely and Booker
Four years after Apprendi, the dissenters’ fears of sentencing
disruption became a reality when the Court extended Apprendi’s
broad rule even further in Blakely v. Washington.186 Blakely pled
guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence
and use of a firearm, an offense that carried a maximum sentence
of fifty-three months under Washington’s Sentencing Reform
Act.187 After determining by a preponderance of the evidence that
Blakely had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” however, the judge
departed upward and imposed an exceptional sentence of ninety
months (thirty-seven months above the state’s guidelines range
but still below the statutory maximum).188 In a 5–4 decision, the
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the ninety-month
sentence violated Blakely’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury.189 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that
Apprendi guarantees this right by ensuring that the judge’s
sentence is based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict
or admitted to by the defendant, and thus, Washington’s
sentencing scheme violated the Constitution despite the fact that
the sentence was within the statutory maximum term of ten
years for Class B felonies.190 “[T]he relevant ‘statutory maximum’
note 23, at 20 (“The Apprendi ruling was indeed craftily written to obtain its
objective, to give the legislature time to begin working on a new system without
the tumultuous jolt of a Supreme Court ruling which instantaneously overrules
[the Federal Sentencing Guidelines] and throws the American criminal system
back thirty years.”).
186. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
187. See id. at 299 (referencing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.320 (2000)).
188. Id. at 299–300.
189. See id. at 306 (noting that Apprendi protects this right by “ensuring
that the judge’s authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury’s verdict”).
190. See id. at 308 (claiming that the Framers’ decision to include a jury
trial guarantee in the Constitution stemmed from an unwillingness to trust
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is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding
additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any
additional findings.”191 In other words, every defendant has the
constitutional right to insist that the prosecutor prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to the punishment.192
The dissenters in Blakely, consisting of the same four
dissenters in Apprendi, strenuously rejected the majority’s
constitutional argument and stressed the practical consequences
that the Court’s holding would have on future judicial
proceedings.193 In the first of three dissenting opinions, Justice
O’Connor lamented that “over 20 years of sentencing reform
[were] all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments
[were] in jeopardy” as a result of the Court’s holding.194 While the
majority claimed that its holding did not address the validity of
the Federal Guidelines,195 the dissenters argued otherwise,
pointing to the similarities between Washington’s determinate
sentencing scheme and that of the Guidelines:196 “If the
Washington scheme does not comport with the Constitution, it is
hard to imagine a guidelines scheme that would.”197 Considering
the number of states with sentencing schemes virtually identical
to Washington’s, the dissenters claimed that the Blakely holding
would result in severe disorder for the criminal justice system,

government to establish the proper role of the jury).
191. Id. at 303–04.
192. Id. at 313. “Blakely suggests the Constitutional [sic] does not permit
judges to find facts which increase applicable sentencing ranges, even though
nearly all sentencing reforms of the past two decades have made judges central
and essential fact-finders in the application of sentencing laws.” Douglas A.
Berman, Examining the Blakely Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16 FED. SENT.
R. 307, 307 (2004).
193. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 323–24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing
the unsettling practical implications of the majority’s holding).
194. Id. at 326. Justice O’Connor went as far as to describe the decision as a
“Number 10 earthquake.” Luna, supra note 43, at 26.
195. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.9 (majority opinion) (claiming that
because the Federal Guidelines are not before the Court, the majority’s holding
offers no opinion regarding the constitutionality of said scheme).
196. See id. at 325 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming that Washington’s
scheme is almost identical to the upward-departure process established by 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
197. Id. at 326.
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forcing many states, as well as Congress, to re-examine years of
sentencing reform.198
The dissenters further stressed that the majority, by
implicitly weakening the viability of determinate sentencing
schemes, actually undermined the very constitutional principles
it claimed to promote through its holding.199 Justice O’Connor
argued that because the majority’s broad extension of Apprendi
would ultimately weaken (or eliminate altogether) determinate
sentencing schemes, defendants would consequently face a
criminal justice system without the safeguards of sentence
uniformity.200 Justice Kennedy further emphasized that the
majority opinion failed to consider the fundamental principle of
collaboration, meaning that different branches of government
must be able to converse and work together on significant issues
of common interest such as improving the judicial sentencing
system:201
Sentencing guidelines are a prime example of this
collaborative process. Dissatisfied with the wide disparity in
sentencing,
participants
in
the
criminal
justice
system . . . pressed for legislative reforms. In response,
legislators drew from these participants’ shared experiences
and enacted measures to correct the problems, which, as
Justice O’Connor explains, could sometimes rise to the level of
a constitutional injury.202

Through its implicit destruction of determinate sentencing,
Justice Kennedy feared the majority had closed a necessary
vehicle for dialogue between the different branches of

198. See McVoy, supra note 57, at 1613 (claiming that Blakely “wreaked
havoc” on established sentencing schemes within the course of just a few
months, requiring trial judges, prosecutors, and legislators across the country to
face the practical realities of a legal system with a rapidly increasing role for the
jury).
199. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 339 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming, for
example, that judges would be unable to base sentencing on real conduct while
also maintaining uniformity under the majority’s holding).
200. See id. at 314 (predicting that the majority’s holding would ultimately
result in a consolidation of sentencing power in the state and federal
judiciaries).
201. Id. at 326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 327.
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government, thereby weakening the fairness and effectiveness of
the criminal justice system.203
As predicted, the Blakely holding created a great deal of
confusion regarding the application of determinate sentencing
schemes; while state legislatures and sentencing commissions
were busy gauging the impact of Blakely on their own sentencing
guidelines, judges too were in a state of limbo, preparing for the
inevitable litany of appeals from those already-sentenced
defendants.204 Within several months of the Blakely decision, the
Court addressed this confusion by consolidating two federal
cases, United States v. Booker205 and United States v. Fanfan,206
and determining whether the imposition of an enhanced sentence
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment.207 Justice Stevens authored the first part of the
Court’s opinion and was joined by the same majority in Apprendi
and Blakely (Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg).208
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment as construed in
Blakely did in fact apply to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
and that by imposing an enhanced sentence based on a
sentencing judge’s determination of a fact not found by the jury
nor admitted to by the defendant, the Guidelines violated the
Constitution.209 The Court primarily based its decision on the
203. See id. at 345
[T]he fairness and effectiveness of a sentencing system, and the
related fairness and effectiveness of the criminal justice system itself,
depend upon the legislature’s possessing the constitutional authority
(within due process limits) to make that labeling decision. To restrict
radically the legislature’s power in this respect, as the majority
interprets the Sixth Amendment to do, prevents the legislature from
seeking sentencing systems that are consistent with, and indeed may
help to advance, the Constitution’s greater fairness goals.
204. See DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 157, at 1323 (describing Blakely’s
aftermath as “electric”).
205. 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956 (2004).
206. No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114 (D.Me. 2004), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956
(2004).
207. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005) (plurality opinion
Part I) (noting that both cases involved the issue of whether application of the
Federal Guidelines violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights).
208. See id. at 225 (listing the division of votes amongst the Justices).
209. See id. at 221 (noting that there was no constitutionally significant
distinction between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington
procedure at issue in Blakely).
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Guidelines’ mandatory nature, noting that if the provisions were
advisory and merely recommended—rather than required—
particular sentences, the application of the Guidelines would not
violate the Sixth Amendment jury trial right.210 When a judge
finds a fact by a preponderance of the evidence that automatically
enhances the defendant’s sentence, however, the defendant
consequently loses his right to a jury determination of those facts
deemed relevant by the judge.211 Justice Stevens also preempted
the practical concerns repeatedly expressed by the dissenters,
noting that while “jury factfinding may impair the most
expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants . . . the interest
in fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury
trial . . . now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment—has always
outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.”212
The second part of the Court’s opinion, authored by Justice
Breyer and joined by the three dissenters to Justice Stevens’s
opinion (in addition to Justice Ginsburg), sought to remedy the
alleged conflict between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Sixth Amendment with a compromise: rather than
invalidating the Guidelines as a whole, Justice Breyer’s opinion
announced that the Court would strike down 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1),213 which made the Guidelines mandatory and
therefore incompatible with the constitutional protections exalted
by Justice Stevens.214 The Court also severed 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e),215 which established a de novo standard of appellate
review and was based on the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines.216 By striking these provisions, the Court recast the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as an “advisory” system, allowing
210. See id. (referencing the language of the Guidelines, for example use of
the word “shall,” as evidence of the system’s mandatory nature).
211. See id. at 233 (suggesting that the Guidelines would be permissible
under the Sixth Amendment had Congress not made the Guidelines binding on
district judges).
212. Id. at 243–44.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (repealed 2005).
214. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (plurality opinion Part II) (stating that
§ 3553(b)(1) is a necessary condition of the constitutional violation).
215. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (repealed 2005).
216. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (plurality opinion Part II) (concluding that
without the aforementioned provisions, the remainder of the Act satisfies the
Court’s constitutional requirements).
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judges to continue making the factual findings necessary for
increased sentences, but no longer in a way that would run afoul
of Blakely and Booker.217 Thus, while still required to consult the
Guidelines’ ranges during sentencing proceedings, judges were no
longer bound to their application.218
E. Alleyne v. United States: The Final Nail in the Coffin?
In the years following Blakely and Booker, courts and
legislatures attempted to navigate the concept of advisory
sentencing and adjust to the increasingly significant jury role
established by the Apprendi revolution.219 On June 17, 2013,
Alleyne v. United States marked what many would consider the
final nail in the coffin for judicial fact-finding in sentencing.220
Alleyne was convicted of robbery affecting commerce and use of a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.221 While the
offense of using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of
violence carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years, the
judge raised the minimum term to seven years under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)222 after determining by a preponderance of the
evidence that Alleyne had “brandished” the firearm.223 Alleyne
appealed, claiming that the jury did not find the fact of
“brandishing” beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore the
217. See id. at 264–65 (claiming that by making the Guidelines advisory, the
sentencing system is still in keeping with Congress’s goal of avoiding excessive
sentencing disparities while maintaining the flexibility needed to individualize
sentences).
218. See Darmer, supra note 40, at 560 (suggesting that the lack of
mandatory application allows the revised sentencing system to avoid
constitutional conflicts).
219. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 338 (2007) (determining
that a court of appeal may presume that a sentence imposed within the proper
Federal Guidelines range is reasonable, although the presumption of
reasonableness is not binding).
220. See Gottlieb, supra note 18 (discussing the importance of Alleyne in the
context of the Apprendi line of cases).
221. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2152 (2013) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (2012)).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
223. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2152 (referencing § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), which
increases the sentence to a mandatory minimum of seven years upon a finding
that the offender brandished the firearm).
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judge’s decision to raise the mandatory minimum sentence based
on that fact violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.224
In yet another 5–4 split, the Court held that “because
mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime,
any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’
that must be submitted to the jury.”225 In vacating Alleyne’s
sentence as violative of the Sixth Amendment, the Court
overruled the previously held distinction between enhancements
that increase a mandatory minimum and enhancements that
increase a mandatory maximum, the latter of which was
addressed in Apprendi.226 The majority concluded that the
holding in Apprendi applied with equal force to facts increasing
the mandatory minimum because a fact that triggers such an
increase likewise alters the prescribed range of penalties: “[A]
fact increasing either end of the range produces a new penalty
and constitutes an ingredient of the offense. It is impossible to
dissociate the floor of a sentencing range from the penalty affixed
to the crime.”227 The majority claimed that the “essential Sixth
Amendment inquiry” is whether a fact is an element of the crime;
in the instant case, the finding of “brandishing” aggravated the
range of possible punishment, and thereby constituted an
element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be found by
the jury.228 Thus, the Alleyne Court brought the Apprendi
revolution to its logical end, establishing that any fact, whether it
increases the mandatory minimum sentence or the mandatory
maximum, is an element of the crime rather than a sentencing
factor and must be submitted to the jury to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.229
224. See id. (noting that the verdict form made no indication that the jury
found the fact of brandishing).
225. Id. at 2513.
226. See id. (overruling Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), which
sustained a judge’s ability to increase the mandatory minimum sentence,
though not beyond the statutory maximum).
227. Id.
228. See id. at 2161 (asserting that it is “impossible to dispute that the facts
increasing the legally prescribed floor aggravate the punishment, heightening
the loss of liberty associated with the crime”).
229. See id. at 2163 (claiming that there is no basis to distinguish facts that
raise the maximum sentence from those that raise the minimum); see also
Gottlieb, supra note 18 (noting that facts that alter both “ceilings” and “floors”
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IV. The Continuing Viability of the Almendarez-Torres Exception
Under Alleyne
By returning judicial fact-finding to the hands of the jury and
solidifying a decade’s worth of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,
the holding in Alleyne seemed to mark the end of a sentencing
era.230 However, the case left one major question unanswered:
what about prior convictions? The Alleyne Court made clear that
any facts contributing to the penalty range of a crime must be
proven to the jury.231 Thus, one might conclude that the fact of a
prior conviction falls within that category as well. Interestingly,
the Court refused to address whether the Alleyne rule
encompassed the previously carved-out exception in AlmendarezTorres: “In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, we recognized a
narrow exception to this general rule for the fact of a prior
conviction. Because the parties do not contest that decision’s
vitality, we do not revisit it for purposes of our decision today.”232
Lower courts have continued to uphold Almendarez-Torres as
good law despite its questionable viability under the holding in
Alleyne.233 “Though wounded, Almendarez-Torres still marches on
have the potential to increase a defendant’s punishment above that which a
judge might have imposed).
230. See Gottlieb, supra note 18 (suggesting that Alleyne provided strong
support and consistency to the pro-Apprendi Court’s Sixth Amendment
sentencing saga).
231. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2153 (referencing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
232. Id. at 2160 n.1.
233. See United States v. Harris, No. 12-14482, 2014 WL 292381, at *8–9
(11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2014) (citing United States v. Thomas, 242 F.3d 1029, 1035
(11th Cir. 2001)).
We recognize that there is some tension between Almendarez-Torres
on the one hand and Alleyne and Apprendi on the other. However, we
are not free to do what the Supreme Court declined to do in Alleyne,
which is overrule Almendarez-Torres. As we have said before, we are
“bound to follow Almendarez-Torres unless and until the Supreme
Court itself overrules that decision.”
Id. See generally United States v. Abrahamson, No. 11-2404, 2013 WL 4780090
(8th Cir. Sept. 9, 2013); United States v. Mack, No. 12-5451, 2013 WL 4767176
(6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2013); United States v. Converson, No. 12-30291, 2013 WL
4473187 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2013); United States v. Flowers, No. 12-14930, 2013
WL 4046024 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2013); United States v. Rivera, No. 12-2116,
2013 WL 3852725 (3d Cir. July 26, 2013); United States v. Carrigan, 724 F.3d
39 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Wiggan, No. 12-2393-cr, 2013 WL 3766535
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and we are ordered to follow. We will join the funeral procession
only after the Supreme Court has decided to bury it.”234 This has
not deterred defendants from raising the issue for later review,
however; in federal circuit courts alone, over 5,200 federal
defendants have filed appeals requesting that Almendarez-Torres
be overruled.235 Given the obvious tension surrounding
Almendarez-Torres and its purported “erosion” by Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, it seems likely that the Court will
eventually need to address the issue of whether the prior
convictions exception still stands under the recent holding in
Alleyne.236 Despite those defendants, prosecutors, and even
certain Justices who argue that Almendarez-Torres is no longer
viable, this Note argues that the Court should ultimately sustain
the prior convictions exception, leave Almendarez-Torres intact,
and establish, with finality, that judges are the correct
adjudicatory body to determine findings of prior convictions in the
sentencing process.
A. The Constitutional Implications of Almendarez-Torres
Before examining the practical implications of AlmendarezTorres, it is important to recognize that the prior convictions
exception is arguably sustainable on constitutional grounds
alone. While the Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants
the right to a trial by jury, the Constitution fails to specify the
role of “nonjury actors” at sentencing after the jury announces a
verdict of guilt.237 The most basic answer to this question is one of
(2d Cir. July 19, 2013); United States v. Croft, No. 12-4890, 2013 WL 3615944
(4th Cir. July 16, 2013).
234. Newton, supra note 145, at 785–86 (citing United States v. Gibson, 434
F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2006)).
235. Id. at 805.
236. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27–28 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]n an appropriate case, this Court should consider AlmendarezTorres’ continuing viability.”).
237. Green, supra note 163, at 1155 (internal citations omitted); see Darmer,
supra note 40, at 579 (“[B]road sentencing discretion was a concept unknown to
the Framers; they never had to consider the constitutional implications of a
choice between ‘submitting every fact that increases a sentence to the jury or
vesting the sentencing judge with broad discretionary authority to account for
differences in offense and offenders.’”).
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categorization: the Sixth Amendment guarantee turns on
whether “a fact is an element of the crime.”238 In other words, the
jury trial protections of the Sixth Amendment require that the
jury find beyond a reasonable doubt only the elements of the
crime as defined by the legislature.239 Thus, the most
straightforward reading of the Constitution dictates that after
finding the elements of the crime and rendering a verdict, the
jury’s role is complete pursuant to the Sixth Amendment.240 Any
prior convictions subsequently found by the judge solely affect the
defendant’s sentence, not his innocence or guilt for the crime with
which he is charged.241 As Justice Breyer writes in his
concurrence in Alleyne, the Court’s reasoning in Apprendi was
flawed in that it failed to appreciate this consistently held
distinction between elements of a crime (facts constituting the
crime for the jury to determine) and sentencing facts (facts
affecting the sentence for the judge to determine).242 The Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee does not traditionally include
those facts solely affecting the defendant’s sentence;243 therefore,
prior convictions do not logically fall within the category of
offense elements and are exempt from the jury trial requirements
of the Sixth Amendment.244
238. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2153 (2013); see also
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 500 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that Sixth Amendment constitutional protections turn on the
determination of which facts constitute “ingredients” of the crime).
239. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 664 (1970) (holding that the jury trial
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right to
demand that a jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of “every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).
240. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2169 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that the
jury’s role was discharged after rendering the verdict and providing the judge
with the appropriate range for sentencing).
241. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244 (1998)
(explaining that recidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense).
242. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2166–67 (Breyer, J., concurring).
243. See id. (noting that the early historical references set forth by the Court
in favor of Apprendi refer to offense elements, not sentencing factors).
244. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (limiting the reasonable-doubt standard to
elements of the crime). But see United States v. Gilliam, 944 F.2d 97, 100 (2d
Cir. 1993) (noting that prior convictions may be proven during the guilt stage
when the prior conviction is an actual, statutorily defined element of the crime
charged, for example, a felon in possession of a firearm).
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This traditional interpretation of the Sixth Amendment is
well supported by the unique nature of recidivism. As previously
discussed, our judicial system has consistently viewed recidivism
as a sentencing factor, not an element of the crime.245 This
categorization seems especially reasonable given that prior
convictions represent “the outcome of earlier proceedings in
which the defendant was afforded procedural safeguards such as
a trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”246 As a
result, the categorical distinction between prior convictions and
offense elements ultimately satisfies the judicial guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment.
Over the course of the Apprendi revolution, however, the
Court has drastically departed from this well-established
distinction between prior convictions and offense elements and
adopted a “broad new interpretation” of the Sixth Amendment’s
scope.247 This overly broad interpretation not only expands the
jury’s role outside of those responsibilities articulated by the
Sixth Amendment, but also impedes the legislature’s authority to
define elements of the crime.248 By restricting the legislature’s
ability to label certain facts as “sentencing factors” versus
“elements of the crime,” the Court ultimately prevents the
245. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Court
would be departing from a well-established tradition if it was to consider
recidivism as an element of the crime, rather than a sentencing factor).
246. A. Luria, Traditional Sentencing Factors v. Elements of an Offense: The
Questionable Viability of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 7 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1229, 1237 (2005).
247. Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT. R. 333,
333 (2004).
248. The pro-Apprendi Court has generally argued that when a sentencing
factor enhances a prescribed sentence, it becomes an element of a separate,
aggravated offense and therefore falls under the Sixth Amendment guarantee.
See, e.g., Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2153 (concluding that because the fact of
brandishing heightens the prescribed sentencing range, it therefore constitutes
an element of a separate, aggravated offense). This argument, however, fails to
appreciate the legislature’s authority to distinguish between elements of a crime
and sentencing factors. Thus, this Note argues that a prior conviction triggers a
new, separate crime only when the legislature makes the clear decision to
statutorily define and articulate that fact as an “element” of the crime. See, e.g.,
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85–86 (1986) (suggesting that the
Pennsylvania Legislature did not include “visible possession” as one of the
enumerated elements of the crime, and thereby designated “visible possession”
as a separate sentencing factor).
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legislature from seeking a sentencing system that is consistent
with the Constitution’s greater fairness goals.249 When put into
practice, an absolute jury fact-finding approach would undermine
constitutional principles central to our judicial system:
The pre-Apprendi rule of deference to the legislature retains a
built-in political check to prevent lawmakers from shifting the
prosecution for crimes to the penalty phase proceedings of
lesser included and easier-to-prove offenses. . . . There is no
similar check, however, on application of the majority’s “any
fact that increases the upper bound of judicial discretion” by
courts.250

If the Court were to re-categorize prior convictions as offense
elements, thereby solidifying a system of absolute jury factfinding, it would not only restrict the legislature’s long-held
responsibility to define the elements of crimes, but also eliminate
a much-needed political check in our criminal justice system.251
Thus, when applied in practice, the pro-Apprendi Court’s broad
Sixth Amendment interpretation generates a host of
constitutional deficiencies. Given that the categorization of prior
convictions is already constitutionally sound, it would be
imprudent to overturn Almendarez-Torres based on such
unsteady reasoning.252
However, even in the event that the Court re-labels
recidivism as an element of the crime, the aforementioned
procedural safeguards attached to prior convictions ensure the
reliability and constitutionality of such facts, thereby eliminating

249. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 345–46 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“[There are concerns] about the obstacles the Court’s decision poses
to legislative efforts to bring about greater uniformity between real criminal
conduct and real punishment; and ultimately about the limitations that the
Court imposes upon legislatures’ ability to make democratic legislative
decisions.”).
250. Id. at 322 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
251. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 225 (1998)
(suggesting that a legislature’s decision to categorize recidivism as a sentencing
factor is within the constitutional limits of the legislature’s authority to define
offense elements).
252. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2166–67 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting
that Apprendi was wrongly decided); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270,
295 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the Apprendi line of cases is
incorrect).
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the need for a jury determination.253 Justice Thomas
acknowledged this consideration in Rangel-Reyes v. United
States,254 conceding that the judicial determination of a
defendant’s prior criminal history “will seldom create any
significant risk of prejudice to the accused” and that there is
ultimately no “special justification” for overruling AlmendarezTorres.255
B. Imagining a Sentencing System Without Almendarez-Torres
The constitutional argument in favor of prior convictions is
admittedly problematic, so imagine for argument’s sake, that
Almendarez-Torres truly is unconstitutional and that by allowing
judges to determine prior convictions, the judicial system in some
way violates defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. Even under
this presumption, the Court should still leave Almendarez-Torres
intact. While absolute jury fact-finding may be an admirable idea
in theory, actual implementation of this system would be far
more than “a modest inconvenience” to our criminal justice
system.256 As Dean Nora Demleitner of Washington and Lee
University School of Law has discussed, many scholars believe
that the judicial system should adhere to a rigid and unyielding
interpretation of the Constitution, no matter what the cost.257
Unfortunately, this goal, however noble, is not only impractical,
but also dangerously crippling to the functioning of a successful,
expedient criminal justice system. The decision to overturn

253. See Garrus v. Sec’y of Pa. Dept. of Corrections, 694 F.3d 394, 400 (3d
Cir. 2012) (stating that a prior conviction has already been established through
procedural safeguards, such as fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial
guarantees (referencing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999))).
254. 547 U.S. 1200 (2006).
255. See id. at 1201 (denying certiorari). Justice Thomas also acknowledged
that countless judges have relied on Almendarez-Torres in making sentencing
determinations and thus, “the doctrine of stare decisis provides a sufficient
basis” for upholding Almendarez-Torres in future cases. Id.
256. Darmer, supra note 40, at 551–52.
257. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 466 (“Let justice be done
though the heavens fall.” (quoting a Roman maxim)).
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Almendarez-Torres would ultimately ignore “the compromises
needed for the judicial system to function.”258
1. Habitual-Offender Statutes
If the Court decided to overrule Almendarez-Torres, thereby
requiring a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of any
prior conviction, the judicial system would have two basic options
in implementing a post-Almendarez-Torres sentencing system.
The first option would be to require the prosecution to plead and
prove prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt during the
guilt stage. This type of system would likely resemble a concept
similar to California’s “Three Strikes” scheme—in other words, a
system of anti-recidivist laws that increase the punishment for
repeat offenders.259 Almost all states have enacted some type of
habitual-offender statute.260 Under these anti-recidivist schemes,
the prosecution must typically plead and prove all known prior
convictions at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.261 Challenges to
such prior convictions are permissible as collateral attacks on the
grounds of “violation of constitutional right to jury trial,

258. See Gaston, supra note 12, at 1172 (describing the split between
proponents and opponents of Almendarez-Torres as a divide of formalists and
functionalists, and describing the pro-Apprendi majority’s view as somewhat
more idealistic, despite potential inefficiency).
259. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 368 (explaining that under
California’s “three strikes and you’re out” policy, many types of prior convictions
qualify as “serious” or “violent,” and thus constitute a “strike”). A third felony
will result in a sentence of at least twenty-five years. Id. Some recidivists may
even receive twice the normal sentence for the current felony conviction
depending on their prior convictions. See Erik G. Luna, Three Strikes in a
Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 1–3, 10 (1998) (referencing CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(e)(1)).
260. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 368 (describing California’s
“Three Strikes” law as the most severe in the country). Under federal law, the
habitual offender statute falls under 18 U.S.C. § 3559, which mandates that a
person who is convicted of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment if the person has been convicted on separate prior occasions of
two or more serious violent felonies or one or more serious violent felonies and
one or more serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1) (2012).
261. See, e.g., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE THREE STRIKES SENTENCING § 4:1 (stating
that the prior convictions must be pled and proved beyond a reasonable doubt
before the Three Strikes law is triggered).
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confrontation, and against self-incrimination.”262 Herein lies one
of the inescapable criticisms surrounding habitual-offender
systems and consequently, one of the primary reasons to uphold
Almendarez-Torres—prejudice to the defendant.
“Rules of evidence have been written to confine trials to
evidence that is strictly relevant to the particular offense
charged. The rationale . . . is not only to ‘prevent a time
consuming and confusing trial of collateral issues,’ but also to
prevent juries from being prejudiced by inflammatory facts.”263
Unlike other sentencing factors that must be proven to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, the introduction of evidence regarding
a defendant’s prior convictions will always pose a significant risk
of prejudice.264 Prior crimes evidence tends to weigh more heavily
with the jurors and pushes them to “prejudge” the defendant,
denying him the fair opportunity to defend against the particular
charge at issue.265 Given the potential for prejudice, it seems
likely that many defendants would actually oppose exercising
their right to insist that the prosecution prove prior convictions to
the jury.266 Moreover, for those defendants who do want to
challenge their prior convictions in front of the jury, the result
will likely be “a mini trial” in which the defendant attempts to
argue constitutional violations that were already addressed at

262. People v. Sumstine, 687 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1984) (en banc).
263. Parese, supra note 63, at 685 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 246–47 (1949)).
264. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 38 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “whatever the merits of the Apprendi doctrine, that
doctrine . . . should not be extended to bear on, determinations of a defendant’s
past crimes . . . .”).
265. See United States v. Harris, 332 F. Supp. 2d 692, 706 (D.N.J. 2004)
(referencing Michaelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948)).
266. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 824 A.2d 123, 123 (Md. 2003) (noting that the
defendant was far more willing to stipulate as to his prior conviction, rather
than allow the jury to hear evidence regarding the name and nature of said
conviction); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on
Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to
Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1361 (2009)
(summarizing previous studies that found that jurors use similar criminal
record information to develop “propensity judgments” and other “negative
evaluations” of a defendant).
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the previous trial,267 thereby expending an unnecessary amount
of the court’s time and resources.
While defendants can minimize the prejudice of their prior
convictions through stipulation,268 the prosecution is entitled,
under most circumstances, to prove its case as it sees fit;269 aside
from violent felonies, the prosecution is typically free to reject a
defendant’s proposed stipulations.270 In an attempt to address
this issue of prejudice, some states have instituted “partial guilty
pleas,” which allow defendants to plead guilty to the prior
conviction, but go to trial for the remaining elements of the
charge.271 These systems, however, are not without fault. Not
only are partial guilty pleas less appealing to the Government,272
they also provide prosecutors with an unfair bargaining chip in
those states that require prosecutors’ consent.273 Thus, there are
few effective mechanisms to protect defendants against prejudice
in habitual-offender systems.

267. James Ardaiz, California’s Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations,
Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 23 (2000).
268. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187–92 (1997) (holding
that the prosecution may not, in a felon-in-possession case, present additional
evidence regarding the defendant’s prior conviction once the defendant has
offered to stipulate to his prior conviction).
269. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Evidence and Ethics: Litigating in the Shadows
of the Rules, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1614, 1645 n.18 (2007) (referencing the Court’s
holding in Old Chief, which recognized the traditional rule that the prosecution
may typically prove its case by evidence of its own choice).
270. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183 n.7 (noting that the Court’s holding is
limited to cases involving proof of felon status); David Robinson Jr., Old Chief,
Crowder, and Trials by Stipulation, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 311, 338 (1998)
(recognizing the limitations of the holding in Old Chief).
271. See Nancy J. King, Juries and Prior Convictions: Managing the Demise
of the Prior Conviction Exception to Apprendi 5–7 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch.
Pub.
Law
&
Legal
Theory
Working
Paper
No.
14-24),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459682 (describing similar
systems in Oregon and North Dakota).
272. See id. at 6 (noting that prosecutors are unable to present the prior
conviction to the jury in a single proceeding under a partial guilty plea
agreement).
273. See id. (stating that the option of a partial guilty plea does not
necessarily mean an unqualified right to plead guilty to the prior conviction).
For example, Nevada requires that the prosecution agree to the stipulation
regarding a prior conviction in cases of partial guilty pleas. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 207.016 (2013).
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Aside from issues of prejudice, there are also practical
concerns associated with habitual-offender schemes. For example,
if the Court overrules Almendarez-Torres and requires that a
sentencing jury find facts of prior conviction as “elements” of the
crime, to what extent does the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause apply? In Washington v. Crawford,274 the Court barred
admission of testimonial hearsay during trial unless the witness
is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness.275 The Court expanded this holding to
encompass forensic evidence in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,276
concluding that a defendant has the right to confront the analyst
who certified his blood-alcohol analysis report (so long as the
report is testimonial within the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause).277 So where does this leave proof of prior criminal
history? Who must testify in regards to these prior convictions?
In federal court, if prior convictions derive from state cases, must
the court clerk from that state testify? Who verifies the prior
convictions to the jury and in what capacity can the defendant
confront that declarant? These are just some of the
administrative questions the Court would have to answer if it
decided to implement a post-Almendarez-Torres system in which
the prosecution pleads and proves prior offenses during the guilt
stage.
2. Sentencing Juries
If the Court determines that the prejudice resulting from
pleading and proving prior convictions during the guilt stage is
too detrimental, it will have to resort to its second option—
implementation of a sentencing jury.278 This type of system
274. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
275. Id. at 36.
276. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
277. Id. at 2707.
278. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 319 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that in order to prevent the evidence of prior convictions
from prejudicing the jury during the guilt determination stage, the Government
“may have to bear the additional expense of a separate, full-blown jury trial
during the penalty phase proceeding”); Jenia I. Turner, Implementing Blakely,
17 FED. SENT. R. 106, 108 (2004) (suggesting that if juries were to determine
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bifurcates criminal proceedings into a trial stage and a
sentencing stage, meaning that the same jury that determines
the defendant’s guilt or innocence also determines facts related to
the defendant’s punishment.279 However, the jury only hears
evidence relevant to sentencing after it has rendered its guilty
verdict so as to avoid any undue prejudice to the defendant.280 In
fact, such a system may even require that evidence of recidivism
be presented separately from evidence of other, more benign
sentencing factors as well.281 While sentencing juries may seem
like a reasonable solution to a post-Almendarez-Torres sentencing
system, sentencing juries are actually fairly unusual in today’s
criminal justice system and a blanket implementation of such
bifurcation would mark a radical decision for the Court. 282
Ultimately, the issues associated with sentencing juries outweigh
whatever constitutional benefits or principles would result from
overturning Almendarez-Torres.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice have long called for
the abolition of jury sentencing in noncapital cases: “Imposition of
sentences is a judicial function to be performed by sentencing
courts. The function of sentencing courts is to impose a sentence
upon each offender that is appropriate to the offense and the
offender. The jury’s role in a criminal trial should not extend to
determination of the appropriate sentence.”283 One of the main
justifications for excluding the jury from the sentencing process is
the potential for bias and inconsistency, two issues the Federal
prior convictions, bifurcation of the process would be inevitable).
279. See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L.
REV. 311, 334–35 (2003) (explaining the bifurcation process).
280. See id. (describing some of the purposes behind the implementation of
sentencing juries, mainly the avoidance of prejudice from evidence of prior
convictions).
281. See King, supra note 271, at 9 n.3 (referencing Greer v. Commonwealth,
No. 2008-SC-000847-MR, 2010 WL 2471842 (Ky. June 17, 2010), in which the
trial was trifurcated: the first phase was the guilt phase for assault and
endangerment charges, the second phase was the guilt phase for the persistent
felony offender charge, and the final phase was sentencing).
282. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 102 (noting that only a halfdozen states allow juries to determine the offender’s sentence: Virginia,
Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma).
283. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING 18-1.4 (3d ed.
1994).

THE PRIOR CONVICTIONS EXCEPTION

459

Guidelines sought to remedy.284 As evidenced by several major
studies regarding the disparities resulting from sentencing juries,
different juries lead to different sentences.285 In one study, an
anonymous poll of juror sentence recommendations demonstrated
that the median recommendation was only 19% of the median
range in the relevant sentencing guidelines.286 Interestingly,
other studies in state courts have shown sentencing juries to
impose more severe and more varied sentences than judges.287
One possible explanation for these discrepancies is the surprising
lack of information given to juries during the sentencing process.
In those states utilizing noncapital sentencing juries, jurors are
not provided with sentencing guidelines or probation statistics
prior to rendering a punishment;288 rather, they are simply asked
to select a sentence somewhere within the statutory sentencing
range.289 Additionally, “aggravating and mitigating factors” that
might assist the jury in making a decision are generally not
identified by statute, nor included in the jury instructions.290
Ultimately, “[n]o state provides juries with anywhere near the
amount of sentence-related information that is currently provided
to judges.”291 Without such information, one wonders how

284. See Parese, supra note 63, at 687 (noting, for example, that the
Apprendi Court’s decision to involve the jury in the sentencing process “missed
the underlying policy of protecting criminal defendants from innate human
bias”).
285. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 104 (describing several studies
assessing the severity of punishment in the context of jury sentencing).
286. See id. at 103 (referencing James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on
Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?,
4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2010)).
287. See id. (referencing Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentences
in Two States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331 (2005)).
288. See Iontcheva, supra note 279, at 355 (noting that sentencing juries in
noncapital cases are merely provided with a minimum and maximum range of
punishment).
289. See Nancy King, How Different Is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital
and Non-Capital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 195, 197 (2004)
(referencing VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIM. NO. P44-100, which permits
the jury in a rape case to select a sentence anywhere between five years and life
in prison).
290. Id.
291. Iontcheva, supra note 279, at 367.
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sentencing juries can effectively fulfill the Sixth Amendment
rights they serve to protect.292
While jurors have limited guidance and experience within
the realm of sentencing, judges are repeat players. “With superior
sentencing experience, a judge may have less apprehension about
early parole release, less expectation that a sentence might be
reduced, a better idea of what an average sentence is, and
sometimes [has] even more mitigating information about the
offender than the jury. . . .”293 Additionally, judges have more
exposure to a range of criminals and are able to save the more
severe sentences for those defendants they recognize as the worst
offenders; a first-time juror, however, may view each offender “as
the worst criminal she’s ever seen.”294 Most important, sentencing
requires a certain level of judicial skill that only a judge develops:
[S]entencing is about more. It is about proportionality; it
requires individualizing so that the punishment fits the crime.
It is not now, nor has it ever been, a one size fits all approach.
It continues to be about deterrence and rehabilitation. Indeed,
far from being incompetent or illegitimate, judicial decisionmaking is central to that enterprise.295

Moreover, a judge is required to write an opinion that is subject
to scrutiny; in the case of sentencing juries, however, appellate
review extends only to “the grossest of errors,” such as sentencing
outside the statutory range.296 Thus, without a solid
understanding of the “larger sentencing framework,” sentencing
juries run the risk of returning to the inconsistent, bias-ridden
sentences of the pre-Guidelines era.297
292. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in
Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 888–89 (2004) (claiming
that juries cannot properly reflect community sentiment about the severity of
sentences because juries do not have the range of information and sentencing
options available to sentencing judges).
293. King, supra note 289, at 206–07.
294. See id. at 207 n.58 (referencing Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252
(1976), in which the Court noted that a trial judge is more experienced in
sentencing than a jury and therefore is “better able to impose sentences similar
to those imposed in analogous cases”).
295. Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and
Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 558 (2007) (emphasis added).
296. King, supra note 289, at 197.
297. See Iontcheva, supra note 279, at 356 (noting that without a
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While many proponents of sentencing juries justify the
practice as a protection of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights, a brief inspection of this bifurcated process shows that
there may be other motives at play. Prosecutors have a major
stake in sentencing by jury in that they can use the bifurcated
process as a tool to push defendants into plea deals: “‘[J]uries will
really lay it on somebody who deserves it,’ reported an Arkansas
prosecutor, ‘I think the fear of having those 12 people do that to
‘em, it moves a lot of cases. . . .’”298 Ultimately, the “wild card”
aspect of jury sentencing and its effect on defendants’
decisionmaking begs the question: is sentencing by jury truly a
mark of democracy or is it a mere bargaining chip for the
prosecution?299 As Justice Breyer noted in Blakely, a sentencing
system that relies too heavily on plea bargaining gives
prosecutors a great deal of control over the sentence, thereby
weakening the relation between real conduct and real
punishment.300 Similarly, Ohio State University law professor
Douglas A. Berman warns that this type of prosecutorial power
will continue to perpetuate disparate sentencing because unlike a
judge’s decision, which is made public, there is no real
mechanism to review a prosecutor’s discretion.301 Thus, the end
result of the proposed bifurcated process—a chilling effect that
discourages defendants from exercising their right to a jury
trial—runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional
guarantees.302
comprehensive understanding of this framework, juries will render disparate
judgments in similar cases).
298. King & Noble, supra note 292, at 896.
299. King, supra note 289, at 197.
300. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 338 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“I do not understand how the Sixth Amendment could require a
sentencing system that will work in practice only if no more than a handful of
defendants exercise their right to a jury trial.”).
301. See Sarah Glazer, Sentencing Reform: Are Mandatory Sentences Too
Harsh?, in CQ REPORTER 27, 30 (Thomas J. Billitteri ed., 2014) (noting that,
according to Professor Berman, disparate sentencing now occurs in the privacy
of a prosecutor’s office, rather than on the judge’s bench).
302. It is important to recognize that judges also have a vested interest in
jury sentencing. Nancy King and Rosevelt Noble refer to this interest as
“deference, dodge, and docket.” King & Noble, supra note 292, at 940. By placing
the sentencing responsibility on juries, trial judges are able to avoid taking
blame for punishment of offenders, thereby deflecting the “electoral outrage”
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In addition to the aforementioned judicial concerns, there are
unavoidable administrative problems associated with the
implementation of sentencing juries. While the Court has made
clear that “principle is more important than pragmatism”303 in
regards to fulfilling the Sixth Amendment, it seems foolish to
discount the practicalities of sentencing administration.304 As the
dissenters in Apprendi emphasized, the Court’s gradual shift
away from judicial fact-finding during sentencing has been
heavily based on constitutional ideals, without much
consideration for the administrative consequences.305 For
example, similar to the habitual-offender scheme discussed in
Part IV.1, if the Court overturns Almendarez-Torres and
institutes sentencing juries to account for the prejudice of prior
convictions, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause may
present administrative difficulties during sentencing. Pursuant to
Williams v. New York,306 the Confrontation Clause does not apply
at sentencing proceedings.307 However, “[a]lthough the
evidentiary rules do not apply to sentencing hearings in federal
or state courts, the overlapping protections of the Sixth
Amendment’s confrontation clause . . . still might require that a
defendant be allowed to cross-examine witnesses . . . .”308 There is
substantial debate as to whether Williams is the appropriate
precedent in determining whether the Confrontation Clause
often associated with sentencing. See Glazer, supra note 301, at 52–53
(referencing King and Noble’s deference, dodge, and docket theory).
303. Turner, supra note 278, at 110.
304. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980) (claiming that policy
arguments must give way when constitutional commands are “unequivocal”).
Given that the constitutional concerns at issue here seem far from
“unequivocal,” this Note argues that they merit a less rigid standard of
adherence as proposed by the pro-Apprendi Court.
305. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“[The real world of criminal justice] can function only with the help
of procedural compromises, particularly in respect to sentencing. And those
compromises, which are themselves necessary for the fair functioning of the
criminal justice system, preclude implementation of the procedural model that
today’s decision reflects.”).
306. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
307. See id. at 253 (concluding that there was no violation of due process
when the defendant’s sentence was based on information supplied by witnesses
with whom the accused had no opportunity to confront).
308. DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 451.
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applies at sentencing proceedings; rather, many commentators
believe that the Apprendi series of cases is the more appropriate
line of precedent.309 Given that the Apprendi saga carved out a
more active role for the jury during sentencing, such a shift in
precedent would indicate that the Confrontation Clause may
eventually apply to sentencing—the more trial-like sentencing
proceedings become, the greater influence evidentiary rules could
have on the federal sentencing process.310 Such a development
would obviously complicate sentencing procedures in a system
without the prior convictions exception.
In addition to evidentiary issues, sentencing juries pose
additional practical concerns—the main one being cost, both in
time and money.311 Financially, the bifurcation of cases means
extending jury duty to the sentencing stage, thereby increasing
jury fees and the amount of “productivity lost” to this elongated
jury duty.312 The cost in time and resources is equally
burdensome.313 While “bifurcation” suggests that there will only
be two parts to a trial, many cases will involve multiple
defendants along with multiple enhancements. In this more
complex scenario, would the jury be required to try all of these
issues in sequence? What if the defendants risk prejudicing one
another in respect to jury consideration of later issues? While the
pro-Apprendi majority has maintained that constitutional
309. See Dustin K. Doty, Saving Face: Arkansas’s Application of the
Confrontation Clause to Jury Sentencing Proceedings, 66 ARK. L. REV. 549, 550
(2013) (noting that many commentators believe that Williams is inconsistent
with the Confrontation Clause analysis established in Crawford).
310. See id. (suggesting that the pro-Apprendi Court may be more willing to
grant defendants the right to confront witnesses during sentencing proceedings
when jury decisionmaking is involved).
311. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 336 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Our experience with bifurcated trials in the capital punishment
context suggests that requiring them for run-of-the-mill sentences would be
costly, both in money and in judicial time and resources.”); Turner, supra note
278, at 110 (claiming that many federal courts have refused to implement
sentencing juries due to the “impractical” and “expensive” nature of such
proceedings).
312. Iontcheva, supra note 279, at 364; see Bibas, supra note 3, at 1144
(suggesting that bifurcation would be far more cumbersome than anticipated as
evidenced by the millions of dollars spent on capital cases).
313. See Turner, supra note 278, at 108 (referencing United States v. Agett,
No. 2:04-CR-10, 2004 WL 1698094, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July 24, 2004), which
emphasized the wasteful delays that would result from a bifurcated system).
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principles must come before pragmatism,314 the aforementioned
questions demonstrate the cumbersome and unavoidable realities
that the Court would need to resolve were it to bifurcate cases
and implement sentencing juries.315
V. Conclusion
By the time the Court reached the final case in its march
through the Apprendi revolution, it had built an extensive
arsenal of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.316 Returning absolute
fact-finding to the jury box, Alleyne left many defendants hopeful
that Almendarez-Torres would consequently be overruled and
that the finding of prior convictions would finally be removed
from the purview of the judge.317 There is a crucial disconnect,
however, between the issue at hand and the remedy being sought.
Why are defendants with prior convictions so concerned with the
possibility of a judge finding the existence of prior criminal
history? Are they concerned with the way the convictions are
proved or are they concerned with the amount of punishment
that follows as a result? It seems reasonable to assume that
defendants are mostly concerned with the fact that a prior
conviction can expose them to a more severe, enhanced sentence.
Overturning Almendarez-Torres, however, is not the right vehicle
to address this concern.
If Alleyne was to mark the death of Almendarez-Torres, the
Court would either need to institute (1) repeat-offender laws,
which would result in prejudice during the guilt-determination
stage, or (2) sentencing juries, which would likely prove too
314. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313 (asserting that the holding in Blakely
“cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or
fairness of criminal justice”).
315. See Iontcheva, supra note 279, at 335 n.134 (“The trial-like factfinding
mandated by Apprendi is clearly more costly and time-consuming than judicial
determinations at a sentencing hearing, added to which is the cost of thousands
of appeals as a result of the dramatic change in sentencing practices mandated
by Apprendi.”).
316. See supra Part III (addressing the saga of case law interpreting the
Sixth Amendment).
317. See supra notes 234–236 and accompanying text (discussing the
growing number of Almendarez-Torres challenges by defendants).
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cumbersome a process to implement throughout our entire
criminal justice system. Both of these options pose judicial and
administrative frustrations, including the possibility of
prosecutorial abuse, inconsistent sentencing, uninformed juries,
evidentiary issues, and the unnecessary expenditure of time and
money.318 The result, therefore, becomes the weighing of a
doctrinaire invocation of a constitutional right and the benefits it
provides to defendants versus the cost such a right would impose
on the judicial system. While “unequivocal” constitutional rights
should trump concerns of judicial administration,319 that is not
the case here. As previously discussed, the pro-Apprendi Court’s
broad Sixth Amendment interpretation is riddled with
imperfections. The alleged right to have a prosecutor prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of prior convictions to a jury is
far from well-established and “unequivocal,” and as such, should
not take precedent over a myriad of unfavorable, burdensome
consequences that would result from the implementation of a
post-Almendarez-Torres sentencing system.
Ultimately, opponents of Almendarez-Torres will need to look
to the legislature, to the Eighth Amendment perhaps, if they
want to change the ways in which prior convictions affect
sentences.320 Defendants will not achieve a reduction in exposure
to sentencing enhancements by simply changing the adjudicatory
factfinder of prior convictions. Having envisioned the framework
of a sentencing system without Almendarez-Torres, the question
arises: how many times would a defendant actually choose to
present or challenge a prior conviction, which has already been
found with procedural safeguards, and voluntarily open himself
up to prejudice from the jury? The answer is likely almost none.
Thus, even if the Court were to determine that AlmendarezTorres violates the Sixth Amendment, overturning the prior
convictions exception would not procure the victory against overpunishment that defendants are truly seeking; therefore, the
318. See supra Part IV (discussing the practical realities of sentencing
juries).
319. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980).
320. See King, supra note 271, at 2 (suggesting that the legislature could
enact a law that would require the Government to inform a defendant before he
admits to guilt or pursues a trial that his conviction will carry a higher sentence
as a result of his prior conviction).
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Court should confirm the viability of Almendarez-Torres and
sustain the prior convictions exception.

